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The study of the character of black politics as a 
significant phenomenon in the American South must consider 
political development in the region as a whole. Such a 
study must also consider the race problem in the American 
South as fundamental to American and Southern institutions. 
This consideration remains the key factor, whether one is 
concerned with black politics throughout the South or a 
particular geographical region, state or local in the 
South. The fact also remains that, as the ideologies 
about Southern development have changed, so have both the 
views about "what to do with the Negro" and the actual 
status of the Negro in Southern life. 
Statement of the Problem 
The development of the American South can be 
summed up by at least three features: (1) as the bastion 
of modern slavery in the United States; (2) by its 
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dependency on the industrial northeast ; and (3) the 
ascendancy of black political authorities. The American 
South became distinguished for a form of politics that 
eliminated blacks from participation in any authoritative 
decision-making. 
The Reconstruction period, however, did bring 
brief political power to the more privileged sector of the 
black community in the South. It was during this period 
that black people had achieved emancipation from slavery, 
O 
the right to bear arms and the right to vote. As tem¬ 
porary as it was, from 1865 to 1877, the Reconstruction 
period, perhaps, was the only period where black people 
have ever exercized political authority in the United 
States. 
With the Reconstruction over and the return of 
"white supremacy" blacks were relegated to the subservient, 
menial position that they were held under during slavery. 
■*■366 William H. Nichols, "The South As a Developing 
Area," 26 Journal of Politics, (February 1964): 24. 
2 
For specific discussion of the impact of Reconstruc¬ 
tion on black people in the South, at least three historical 
accounts are useful: James S. Allen, Reconstruction: The 
Battle for Democracy; 1865-1876, (New York : International 
Publishers, 1937); William Z. Foster, The Negro People in 
American History, (New York: International Publishers, 
1954), 260-269 ; and W. E. B. DuBois, Black Reconstruction 
in America, (New York: Russell & Russell" 1962). 
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Concretely, this situation was given added impetus by the 
1896 Plessy vs. Ferguerson^ decision, in which the Supreme 
Court declared "separate-but-equal" to be consistent with 
the American constitution. Ideologically, this situation 
remained a constant well into the twentieth century, and 
was manifested in all the devices that denied to blacks 
the ballot; i.e., the white primaries, the poll tax, and 
the literary test. The 1944 Smith vs. Allwright4 decision 
represents one salient point at which the position of 
blacks began to change.^ it was this decision that declared 
the white primaries unconstitutional. Prior to this 
decision not only had the race problem not been recognized 
as a Southern or an American problem, but scholarly 
research was also limited. Ten years after the Smith 
decision the Supreme Court went further to make a dent 
in the "solid South." The 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education^ 
decision reversed the "separate-but-equal" clause. 
The Civil Rights Movement of the mid-fifties and 
the nineteen-sixties was the decisive turn that pointed to 
^Plessy vs. Ferguerson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896). 
4Smith vs. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944). 
~*See Hugh D. Price, The Negro and Southern Politics, 
(New York: New York University Press, 1957). 
g 
Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 
347 U. S7~4ff3-7T954)'.   
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black political activity as a new feature of Southern 
politics. The prime aim of the Civil Rights Movement was 
to break down the segregated system in the South, i.e., 
to achieve the right to vote and to acquire access to 
public accommodations.^ Civil Rights activity occurred in 
many counties and was countered by some of the most bla¬ 
tant and brutal forms of racial oppression. Events in 
many of these counties represented salient episodes in 
the Civil Rights Movements. The success of the Civil 
Rights movement is often attested by the removal of 
segregation and the subsequent rise of black authorities. 
Places such as Lowndes County, Alabama, Madison County, 
Mississippi; and Tensas Parish, Louisiana stand out. 
However, on the other side of this development are those 
counties where there are no black political authorities 
and no meaningful input into the decision-making of the 
polity. Bogalusa, Louisiana in Washington Parish is one 
such situation. This thesis undertakes a study of the 
character of the politics in this small southeastern 
Louisiana town - which continued well into the 1970's 
without black political authorities. 
^See Leon Friedman, The Civil Rights Reader; Basic 
Documents of the Civil Rights Movement, (New York: Walker 
and Company, 1967); Martin Luther King, Jr., Stride Toward 
Freedom, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958); and King, 
Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community?, (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1968). 
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Bogalusa was developed as a mill town settlement 
in 1906. It's settlement was characteristic of the New 
South strategy that began at the turn of the twentieth 
century. The name, Bogalusa comes from the Choctaw 
Indian word, "Bogue Lusa," meaning dark or smoky waters; 
which was characteristic of the creek that ran through 
the town. The town was incorporated on July 4, 1914. It's 
entire growth has always been contingent on its industrial 
development. In 1906, the Great Southern Lumber Company 
was established as one of the largest lumber operations 
in the world. It was the Gaylord Container Corporation, 
however, that took control of Great Southern in 1936 and 
launched the town as one of the outstanding manufacturing 
places of pulp, paper, and boxes in the South. The pre¬ 
sent company, the Crown Zellerbach Corporation, merged 
with the Gaylord Corporation in November 1955; with the 
Gaylord Corporation becoming one of the divisions of 
Crown Zellerbach. The advent of the Crown Zellerbach 
Corporation brought to Bogalusa the first and only multi¬ 
national corporation. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to analyze the 
character of politics in this town dominated by a multi¬ 
national corporation. Prior to 1965 black political life 
was not considered a part of the larger Bogalusa community. 
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For Bogalusa was one of those towns where Jim Crow 
laws and the Ku Klux Klan represented both the law and 
the order. A rigid segregation system denied blacks par¬ 
ticipation in the political process, i.e., blacks were 
still being denied the right to register and vote and 
access to public acconmodations. Other than teaching, 
preaching or working at Crown Zellerbach there were few 
"decent" jobs for blacks. However, even at Crown 
Zellerbach blacks were faced with a segregated line of 
progression, lower wages and the worst of jobs.** 
When the Civil Rights Movement began in 1965, it 
was a dual movement. First, against the caretakers of 
a segregated town, that systematically kept blacks from 
participating in the life of the town. And second, against 
the Crown Zellerbach Corporation, which helped to maintain 
that system of segregation. The rise of a militant politi¬ 
cal leadership in the Bogalusa Civic and Voters League 
and the Deacons for Defense and Justice was the impetus 
for the struggle against the city of Bogalusa and the Crown 
Zellerbach Corporation. 
This study covers a ten year period, from 1965 to 
1975. A descriptive analysis is made on the leadership, 
the issues, and the outcome of the activities during this 
**See Herbert R. Northrup, The Negro in the Paper In- 
dustry, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1969), pp. 97-98. 
-7- 
period. The specific study of the character of black 
politics within this ten year period is preceded by a his¬ 
torical analysis of Bogalusa within the New South era and 
the Crown Zellerbach Corporation. The study posits 
that although the South in general may have changed - 
especially in the ascendency of black persons to authorita¬ 
tive political positions - Bogalusa, Louisiana is still 
ideologically in the New South. Segregationists and 
white chauvinists dominate political life there, and the 
Crown Zellerbach Corporation has successfully maintained 
its dominance over the town. 
Outline 
This thesis is composed of six chapters. Chapter 
One is the introduction; consisting of the statement of 
the problem, the outline, and the methodology used in the 
research. Chapter Two is a survey of the literature. 
Chapter Three is a description of the development of Bogalusa, 
Louisiana from a small mill town settlement to the advent 
of the multinational corporation, Crown Zellerbach. 
Chapter Four is a descriptive analysis of the Civil Rights 
Movement in Bogalusa, Louisiana. Chapter Five is a descrip¬ 
tive analysis of the activity that characterizes the 
changes in the status of blacks in Bogalusa within the past 
ten years. Chapter Six are conclusions and a summary 
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evaluation. An appendix and a bibliography are included 
at the end of the thesis. 
Methodology 
Information for this study was acquired through 
several means. These included the usual library materials, 
covering books and journal articles on Southern and black 
politics and on multinational corporations and newspaper 
accounts of the Civil Rights Movement in Bogalusa. Un¬ 
published, first-hand documents belonging to various indi¬ 
viduals in Bogalusa also provided useful information. 
During the Summer of 1976, I spent one month in Bogalusa 
interviewing selected personalities through open-ended 
interviews. Participant observation was also available 
as a source of information, because the author had parti¬ 
cipated in and observed some of the events as they developed 
during this ten year period. 
CHAPTER II 
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 
Three types of literature are relevant to this 
thesis; (1) studies dealing with the South as a region, 
(2) studies dealing with black politics, and (3) studies 
concerning the purpose and function of multinational 
corporations. There have been few studies of the South 
that have attempted to come to terms with the relationship 
of development to the ascendency of black political 
authorities as a fundamental part of an overall development. 
This thesis, then, undertakes a study of one small town 
that grew out of the racial and developmental strategies 
of the New South. It is intended to describe its efforts 
to evolve into the latest era of Southern politics. 
I 
The literature that has been done on the American 
South has been extensive in subject matter and voluminous 
in quantity. One useful way to discuss it is in terms of 
its relationship to particular ideologies of Southern 
development. The South has been generally considered in 
three different historical periods distinguished according 
-9- 
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to the dominant development strategy: the Old South, the 
New South, and the New-New South (or the Post-new South-*-) . 
These three periods represent a useful historical framework 
to investigate concrete relations in the American South. 
The literature on the South will be discussed according 
to the above three historical periods, and will give 
particular emphasis to the changing position of the black 
community as conceived in each period. 
The emphasis on race relations results as C. Vann 
Woodward points out, from the fact that this peculiarity 
was most often used to distinguish one order from another, 
not only as a way to discuss the relations between the races, 
2 
but more particularly the concrete status of the Negro. 
The Old South 
The Old South as an institution was the slave South. 
-*-The historian George B. Tindall used the term Post- 
New South to refer to the recent period in the American South, 
characterized by the disappearance of the one-party system, 
the one crop system in agricultural and industry, the death 
of Jim Crow, and the rise in levels of education. This 
period is also characterized by the ascendency of black per¬ 
sons to authoritative decision making positions. However, 
Tindall does not give explicit attention to this latter de¬ 
velopment. See his book, The Persistent Tradition in New 
South Politics, (Baton Rouge, Lousiana State University Press, 
1975), pp. 2 and 72. 
2 
C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 5~. 
^See Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, The Slave Economy of the 
Old South, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1968) and 
Clement Eaton, A History of the Old South: The Emergence of a 
Reluctant Nation^ (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 
vmr.  
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lt may be dated through 1865. As an ideological phe¬ 
nomenon it remained well into the twentieth century being 
variously referred to as the "solid South," "agrarianism," 
the "Redeemers," "reunionism" and the like. Moreover, 
as an institution the Old South had a peculiar position 
in relation to the other regions in the United States. 
It had developed a distinctive economy, with which its 
whites identified, and which gave importance to tradition 
as the way to maintain its own peculiar way of life. 
According to Jesse T. Carpenter, the Old South viewed it¬ 
self as both a distinct section and a minority.^ In this 
case, a minority that had the right to perserve its cul¬ 
tural peculiarities, and to decide how it was to develop 
without the interference of the rest of the nation. 
Although Carpenter’s observations covered the South 
over a period of eighty years from 1781 - 1861, this 
same view of Southern sectionalism was the dominant theme 
of other observers. Charles S. Sydnor in his book, The 
Development of Southern Sectionalism, 1819 - 1848^ 
^Jesse T. Carpenter, The South as A Conscious Mino¬ 
rity, 1781 - 1861, (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 
'’Charles S. Sydnor, The Development of Southern 
Sectionalism, 1819-1848, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1953). 
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made the same point as Carpenter, while confining his 
study to twenty-nine years. However, it was, perhaps, Avery 
0. Craven who best captured the essence of the South as 
a minority and a distinct section. His view of a 
Southern "nationalism" embodied the essence of the antago¬ 
nism between the North and South which led to the outbreak 
of the Civil War. Craven confined his study to thirteen 
years, from 1848 - 1861. 
The importance of these studies lie not in the 
periods considered, but the conceptualization of the South 
as a distinct entity. While agreeing with Carpenter and 
Sydnor on a South that was conscious of its minority status 
and sectionalism vis-a-vis the rest of the nation, it is 
Craven's view that best sums up the eighty year period that 
Carpenter studied. Southern "nationalism" was the only 
way some elites could maintain their cultural identity and 
hold on to their possessions - which included black people- 
And as history recorded, like other "nations," the South 
was willing to secede from the Union to illustrate its 
"self-determination" and its will to maintain its system. 
With the victory of the North, Lincoln's "Emancipation 
£ 
Avery 0. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 
1841 - 1861, (Baton Rouge"! Louisiana State University Press, 
1953) . 
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Proclamation," and the thirteenth, fourteenth, and 
fifteenth amendments Southern nationalism rapidly became 
a dying institution. 
The Reconstruction was the decisive juncture 
in North-South relations. This period was characterized 
by the presence of black persons in authoritative politi¬ 
cal positions. The end of Reconstruction meant a return 
to the general form of race relations that characterized 
the Old South with black subordination. This was institu¬ 
tionalized in the rise of segregated institutions. 
According to Claude H. Nolen, the results were the 
"redemption" of the South and the disfranchisement of the 
Negro; with the latter being legitimized through segregated 
institutions. 
Nolen clarifies the matter in these terms : 
disfranchisement was the key to the subordination 
of Southern Negroes. Without political influence 
they watched helplessly as their masters used the 
machinery of the state against them in every area 
of society, providing the conditions and discipline 
to maintain quasi-slavery, including the toleration 
of lynch mobs and other forms of occasional violence. 
With free use of the suffrage, Negroes would have 
helped govern the whole of society, as they had 
during Reconstruction, and could have effectively 
opposed those measures designed to hold them in 
an exploitable black caste. The so-called redemption 
of the South land its late born twin, disfranchise¬ 
ment, were but expressions of prejudices used, though 
many whites did not know it, as a means to perpetuate 
white domination over blacks.7 
^Claude H. Nolen, The Negro's Image in the South, 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967) , pp. 9TT-91. 
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Ralph McGill in his book, The South and the Southerner, 
made the same conclusions; confirming the redemption of 
O 
the South as the establishment of a "caste system."0 
Gunnar Myrdal made a similar point on the conduct of South¬ 
ern whites during elections. Myrdal observed that the do¬ 
minant white Southerners found it easier to establish 
intricate election laws and thereby manipulate the 
Q 
election machinery against the Negro. 
The Old South, as an ideological phenomenon gained 
its greatest impetus toward the end of the nineteen 
twenties. Twelve Southern "gentlemen," most of whom were 
from the Humanities Department at Vanderbilt University 
had taken their stand in defense of Southern tradition 
and against New South encroachment. They sought to 
define "a Southern way of life" against what they called 
"the American or prevailing way."^ Their theme was 
"Agrarian versus Industrial." ^ To them, agrarianism 
^Ralph McGill, The South and the Southerner, 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), pp. ZÜ1-202. 
Q 
^Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma : The Negro 
Problem and Modern Democracy, (New York: Harper and 
Brothers Publishers, 1944), p. 450. 
^Twelve Southerners, "I'll Take My Stand: The South 
and the Agrarian Tradition. (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1930), p. DL 
11 
Ibid., p. ix. 
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was the essence of the Southern tradition and the testing 
point of Southern loyalty. Their contention was that the 
whole way they live, act, thought and felt was rooted in 
the agrarian way of life of the older South, not in the 
secular urbanism of the North. Their call was for "anti¬ 
industrial measures" which "might promise to stop the 
advances of industrialization, or even undo some of them."12 
The Georgia historian Ulrich B. Phillips in his book, Life 
and Labor in the Old South, made a similar attempt to 
prescribe the test of Southern loyalty.^ Phillips' 
definition was confined to a preoccupation with race con¬ 
sciousness. Phillips' fundamental contention was that the 
South shall be and remain a white man's country. 
Both of these positions upholding the Old South 
tend to lend support to W. J. Cash's basic proposition 
about the mind of the South. According to Cash, the mind 
of the South is continuously in the past ; which is deter¬ 
mined by the purely agricultural conditions of that past."^ 
12 lb id., pp. xix - xx. 
l^See Ulrich B. Phillips, Life and Labor in the Old 
South, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1929). 
■^W. J. Cash, The Mind of the South, (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 19417"! 
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Its mind and body is so far removed from modernization 
that it has actually marched away from the present and 
future toward the past. 
In 1964, William H. Nichols summed up the problems 
of the Old South in its final efforts to maintain its 
institutional and ideological existence. Nichols points 
to four problems : 
(1) The South embraced an agrarian philosophy 
which positively opposed industrial-urban 
development as an inferior way of life. 
(2) The South took over from England the "aris¬ 
tocratic idea" of a society dominated by 
landholders, with a carefully stratified 
and rigid social structure in which first 
the Negro and later the typical white had 
his place. 
(3) The South's political structure was based 
on a narrow electorate which gave dispro¬ 
portionate weight to the economic interests 
of large planters. 
(4) The South's dominant socio-political leader¬ 
ship gradually lost its sense of social 
responsibility, reflected particularly in 
its opposition to the advancement of public.. s 
education and industrial-urban development. 5 
The New South - 1877-1960 
In the place of the Old South, as an institution was 
created a New South that came after the abolition of 
slavery, and the ending of Reconstruction, and aspired for 
industrialization and intersectional reconciliation. 
According to Francis Butler Simkins, the New South recog- 
^William H. Nichols, "The South as a Developing Area," 
Journal of Politics. (February, 1964): pp. 24-25. 
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nized the supremacy of the Union, emancipated Negro 
*| £ 
labor and equality under the law. This gave impetus 
to the ideas of business success and industrial advance¬ 
ment, and prompted the concept of universal education, 
with new ideas on religion and science. 
The New South ideology was not an ideology of 
race. One of its most prominent ideologues, Henry Grady 
made this point well in his treatise, The New South.^ 
While calling for industrialization and rapproachement 
with northeastern capital Grady wanted to maintain a place 
for the Negro. This latter position was enhanced by the 
phenomenon of segregation. As an institution, the New 
South began at the end of Reconstruction in 1877. Despite 
the entrenchment of the "solid South" after 1877 the New 
South strategy became the competing ideology against the 
Old South reaction. 
The Louisiana State University's ten-volume serial, 
History of the South has two outstanding and exhaustive 
studies on this period: Woodward's Origins of the New 
South, 1877 - 1913 and Tindall's The Emergence of the New 
South, 1913 - 1945. Woodward's study captured the essence 
■LOFrancis Butler Simkins, The Everlasting South, 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), p. 40. 
■^Henry W. Grady, The New South, (New York: Robert 
Bonner Sons, 1890). See also Grady's The New South and Other 
Addresses, (New York: Haskell House Publisher.Limited, 1969) 
and The New South: Writings and Speeches of Henry Grady, 
(Savannah, Georgia: The Beehive Press, 1971). * 
■^Woodward, (1951) and Tindall, (1967). 
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of the necessity for New South development. He suggests 
that the basic objects of New South development were 
poverty and the lack of capital. According to Woodward, 
these were not merely sociological abstractions but power¬ 
ful needs of both the dominant class and the ordinary 
people of the region. Woodward suggests that, unlike 
any other ruling class in the United States the Southern 
ruling class at the end of Reconstruction found itself 
stripped of all economic foundation. Everyone had been 
stripped of grace and power; the old planter class and the 
leading financial, commercial and industrial families, 
therefore giving way to desperation and the need to 
19 recoup their losses. 
By the time of the New South's "emergence" the 
Progressive movement had taken new root. In one sense 
that made the advent of the New South significant in light 
of Woodward's observations about the desperation facing 
white Southerners. The Progressive movement which was 
prepared to accept some industrialization was still tied 
to the "agrarian arcadia" and "to an economy of small 
property, independent farmers, storekeepers, and at least 
relatively small-scale manufacturers." With the losses 
suffered by the prime Southern ruling class, Tindall states 
■^Woodward, p. 29. 
^^Tindall, p. 7. 
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that the progressive cause was shared by the middle-income 
O 1 
groups. These groups were concerned with taking over 
where the old planter class had failed; basically to 
own and develop productive property. With the help of 
small farmers, manufacturers and merchants they were 
able to function as both capitalist and labor. Therefore, 
they were able to propagate their Southern traditionalism 
while maintaining a general call for industrialization and 
economic advancement. The point to be made here, is that 
the "origins" and "emergence" of the New South developed 
just as much from Southern tradition and loyalty as they 
did from the constraints placed on that traditionalism 
and loyalty from Northern capital. 
The New South ideology did not demand total en¬ 
franchisement of blacks. As Woodward points out elsewhere, 
the determination of the Negro's place took shape gradually 
under the influence of economic and political conflicts 
among the divided white people - conflicts that were 
22 eventually resolved at the expense of the Negro. One 
such example was the obvious use of the Negro as a cheap 
labor source and needless to say, his relegation to the 
lower rungs of the economic ladder. While on the other 
21Ibid., p. 5. 
22 Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, pp. 6-7. 
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hand, the Negro would be subjected to segregation 
statutes as constant reminders: of his inferior 
23 
position. In Louisiana "out and out" reigns of 
terror was instituted against blacks as the way in which 
to develop white solidarity against the enfranchisement 
of blacks.^ Some of the literature on political develop¬ 
ment in that State did not consider blacks a part of the 
broad social categories. Robert W. Shuggs, in his book, 
Origin of Class Struggle in Louisiana, excluded the Negro 
from the category of the masses because he viewed blacks 
as belonging to a racial caste rather than a social class. J 
The New South ideology; beyond considering the Negro 
as a cheap and useful source of labor, failed to remove the 
Negro from the type of social relations that so distinguished 
the old South. In a word, Southern tradition remained 
just as entrenched. Simkins made the point as such: 
examination of many of the phases of the institu¬ 
tional life of the New South reveals a constantly 
recurring condition; despite the changes which the 
catastrophe of 1865 (Reconstruction) made inevitable 
^See Robert L. Brandfon (ed.), The American South 
in the Twentieth Century, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell 
Company 1967). 
^See Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in 
Louisiana, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1971) and William Ivy Hair, Bourbouism and Agrarian Protest : 
Louisiana Politics, 1877 - 1900, (Baton Rouge : Louisiana 
State University Press, 1969). 
25 
Robert W. Shuggs, Origins of Class Struggle in 
Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1939). 
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the distinctive culture of the section was never 
destroyed. In politics, to cite the most obvious 
example, the South responded to the suggestion 
that the Negro be given the equalities mentioned 
in the declaration of Independence by reducing the 
race to political impotence. The opening since, 
1937, of the Democratic primaries to the Negro 
by the Federal courts effected a change more 
technical than actual. While there was a con¬ 
siderable increase in colored voters, the new voters 
generally won the privilege of ratifying procedures 
already determined by white majorities. An un¬ 
changing caste system except in rare cases pre¬ 
vented the Negro from becoming a candidate for 
office or from effecting policies contrary to the 
will of whites. 
The obvious conclusion, then, about the New South ideology, 
is that it did not seek to contend against the basic social 
classification that kept "the Negro in his place," while 
industrialization was taking hold in the South. It merely 
left the race problem unresolved. 
The phenomenon of segregation appeared to be the 
vestige of institutional existence for the remaining Old 
South groups. After losing to the North in the Civil War 
the remaining Old South groups took the position that the 
war had resolved the problem of the relation of the states 
to the federal government without destroying the rights of 
the states. The acceptance of this position by proponents 
of the New South ideology was, in the final analysis, the 
acceptance of segregation as the means by which the remaining 
Old South groups participated in the New South strategy. 
26 Simkins, p. 46. 
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Segregation did two things: (1) it made possible 
agreement between proponents of the New South and the 
remaining Old South groups on industrialization and the 
institutions that would be developed by industrialization, 
and (2) it left the resolution of the race problem with 
these Old South groups. 
The literature on the various developmental 
strategies for industrialization has analyzed the tactical 
and strategic considerations which developed from the New 
South ideology. Scholars such as Howard W. Odum, Edgar 
T. Thompson, Marshall R. Colberg, William H. Nichols, 
Calvin B. Hoover and B. C. Ratchford have all done ex¬ 
haustive studies on Southern development and research on 
27 development since the nineteen-thirties. Journal 
articles by such people as Arthur Coleman, Albert Lepawsky, 
Gerald D. Nash and Dewey H. Grantham have contributed 
to the importance of understanding the New South as a 
prerequisite to understanding the dynamics of regional 
^^See Howard W. Odum, Southern Regions of the United 
States, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1936) ; Edgar T. Thompson, Perspectives on the South: Agenda 
for Research, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967); 
Marshall R. Colberg, Human Capital in Southern Development, 
1939-1963, (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 
1965) ; William H. Nichols, Southern Tradition and Regional 
Progress, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1960) and Calvin B. Hoover and B. C. Ratchford, 





Albert Lepawsky provides an excellent tracking of 
government planning in his article, "Governmental 
Planning in the South." Lepawsky points out two 
unique characteristics that would make government planning 
possible in the South; first, the homogeneous Southern 
economy, agrarianism; and the second, the availability of 
a strong "statehouse" tradition that permits the use of 
29 
its institutions for planning. Overall government 
planning in the South was the design of a "master plan," 
covering both public and private concerns; i.e., public 
works and improvements, social services, and commercial 
enterprise. Lepawsky begins with the comprehensive 
planning of the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1938-1939 
as the prime example of sound government planning. The 
establishment of TVA constructed towns were the impetus 
for Southern metropolitan planning in such places as 
Atlanta and Birmingham. The TVA establishments were also 
the models in county and rural areas of the South. Lepawsky's 
2 8 
See Arthur Coleman, "The South's Chance at Industry," 
25 Nation's Business (October 1937); Albert Lepawsky, 
"Governmental Planning in the South," 10 Joupial of Politics 
(August 1948): pp. 536-567; Gerald D. NasH^ "Research Oppor- 
tunities in the Economic History of the South After 1880," 
32 Journal of Southern History (August 1966); pp. 308-324; 
and Dewey W. Grantham, "The Regional Imagination: Social 
Scientists and the American South," 34 Journal of Southern 
History (February 1968): pp. 3 - 32. 
29 Albert Lepawsky, "Governmental Planning the South," 
10 Journal of Politics (August 1948): p. 536. 
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overall point in his survey is the use of planning as 
the answer to the dilemmas of regionalism. And as the 
one way to reckon with the "Nation's No. 1 economic 
problem"-^ in general. 
According to some observers the New South strategy 
was not successful. While it raised the essential questions, 
it failed to make a decisive turn in the Southern predica¬ 
ment. William C. Havard states in The Changing Politics 
of the South, that "despite the promises of the advocates 
of the idea of the New South in the 1880's and thereafter 
the failure to diversify the prevailing form of agricul¬ 
tural capitalism and to develop supplemental industrial 
enterprises left the South in its peculiar agrarian context 
during most of the period of the development of the United 
31 States toward its present urban-industrial configuration. 
Havard also observes that in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries the South was only to recruit the more 
decimating kind of industries; such as the textile mills 
and lumber industries. 
Clarence H. Danhof provides a study of the entire 
New South strategy in Greenhut and Whitman's book, Essays 
30 Report to the President on the Economic Conditions 
in the South, National Emergency Committee, (Washington, 
ET C. , ) p. 8F. 
31 
William C. Havard, (ed.), The Changing Politics of 
the South. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1972), p. 9. 
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OO 
In Southern Economic Development. Here Danhof surveys 
the body of literature which deals with Southern regional 
development. While describing the general categories of 
the debators on regional development, as journalists, 
sociologists, historians and economists; Danhof points out 
that no single position can be accepted as a Southern 
doctrine on the South's economic problems. Danhof's 
essay considers the forty years of thought on Southern 
development following nineteen-twenty. Such was the focal 
point, because according to Danhof after 1920, "the propo¬ 
sition that the Old South was a viable system in a modern 
33 world was no longer tenable." And the development of 
new methods to achieve the New South was the order par¬ 
ticularly in light of a growing population, a rapidly 
depressing economy and technological change. 
Danhof's basic accomplishment was a summation of 
the strategies offered for Southern development. He con¬ 
sidered those as "four basic approaches to a more satis¬ 
factory economic order.The four approaches embodied 
32ciarence H. Danhof, "Four Decades of Thought On 
The South's Economic Problems," in Melvin L. Greenhut and 
W. Tate Whitman, (eds.), Essays in Southern Economic Develop- 
ment, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
IM). 
33Ibid., p. 10. 
34Ibid., p. 12. 
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the solutions that had been advocated by differing elements 
in the debate on Southern development since the end of 
Reconstruction: First, was the position of affirming 
traditional values, second, was the incremental improve¬ 
ment in the position of farmers, third, was the advocacy 
of out-migration by "disaffected Southerners," and fourth, 
was support for industrial development as the only solution 
to region's problem. The approach that emerged dominant 
was the latter. Very little impact from Southerners was 
prevalent, thus, like the debate, the industrial input 
reflected very little of the indigenous South: "Southern 
entrepreneurs emerged in a few industries and achieved 
some regional and even national dominance. The pursuit 
of industrialization, however, continued to be based 
O R 
on the importation of employers." 
One crucial point Danhof makes in his essay is his 
rejection of the "conspiracy thesis.This thesis was 
underlined by several notions : that the South was an 
exporter of raw materials, commodity rate discrimination, 
monopolization of the South by large Northern corporation, 
and absentee-ownership of the South's industries. Danhof 
35Ibid., p. 23. 
O £ 
Ibid., p. 44; See also Gerald D. Nash, "Research 
Opportunities in the Economic History of the South After 
1880," 32 Journal of Southern History (August 1966); 
pp. 308-325"! 
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re jected these notions and the basic theory of a conspiracy 
against the South as having no substance; he argued that: 
the colonial-imperialistic thesis of conspiracy 
must be considered an unfortunate episode - a re¬ 
surgence of a crude sectionalism - that diverted 
the attention of some of the South's ablest men 
from constructive approaches to the region's 
problems. It was attractive to some who held the 
liberal belief that a more newly perfect mobility 
of factors would solve the South's difficulties. 
It was also attractive to some who found in it an 
escape from the burdens they carried. The conspi¬ 
racy thesis shifted those burdens to others, and 
carried with it claims for compensation to be 
secured from the federal government.37 
Danhof concludes, in the final analysis, that industriali¬ 
zation stimulated by the national economy provided the type 
of environment for a resolution of the South's economic 
problems. 
Lepawsky's survey, unlike Danhof's defended the need 
for the development of a planning theory, as the prerequi¬ 
site for a planning government for the Southern region. 
Lepawsky concluded that the South's problems were purely 
economic; while Danhof emphasized those problems as social 
and political, by viewing the overall solution of the 
South's problems as a mediation of all three factors. Danhof 
put the problem this way: 
"throughout, it has remained true that the economy 
of the South has evolved as the capabilities of its 
citizens to respond to their environment have been 
enhanced. That experience suggests that persistent 
adherence to the fundamental task of upgrading human 
capabilities is theotegion's best guarantee of 
continued growth. 
^^Danhof, p. 50. 
38 
Ibid., p. 68. 
-28- 
O Q 
Pat Watters emphasized in The South And the Nation^ the 
social and political considerations of planning and develop¬ 
ment in raising the ability of the regional economy to have 
"liberalizing social influences" upon race relations, among 
other things, Watters' book is a rather general view of 
the South in the Sixties. His survey is both of the 
changing mentality and structure of the South; and its dis¬ 
tinctive economy, culture and dilemmas. 
The above has been a survey of literature on Southern 
development. The principal concern has been a survey of 
Southern developmental ideologies and strategies. The 
survey focused on the Old South is one way to understand 
the context out of which grew the ideological and institu¬ 
tional realities that have characterized the status of blacks. 
The survey of New South conceptualizations enable us to come 
to terms with the relationship between industrial growth 
that the New Southerners proposed and the nature of the 
changes in race relations as a result of the New South 
strategy. Focus on this latter period was an attempt to 
assess the actual changes in the American South since 
Reconstruction through the nineteen-sixties. From this sur¬ 
vey we conclude that in order for the New South strategy to 
have succeeded it had to come to terms with the larger 
•30 
Pat Watters, The South and the Nation, (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1969), p"! 
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social and political considerations that actually retarded 
industrial growth. 
II 
We now come full circle to the literature directly 
concerned with the impact of the race question on political 
questions. The classic study of Southern politics was done 
by a political scientist and published in 1949. V. 0. Key's 
magnum opus, Southern Politics in State and Nation4^ became 
the model for studying the politics of the region. Key did 
not hesitate to get at the core of the South's problem. 
His premise was striking; "the South may not be the nation's 
number one political problem, as some Northerners assert, 
but politics is the South's number one problem."4''' At the 
time of Key's study, if anything remained in the ethos of 
Southern tradition, it was Southern politics: 
in its grand outlines the politics of the South 
revolves around the position of the Negro. It is 
at times interpreted as a politics of free trade, 
as a politics of agrarian poverty, or as a politics 
of planter and plutocrat. Although such interpre¬ 
tations have a superficial validity, in the last 
analysis the major peculiarities of southern 
politics go back to the Negro. Whatever phase of 
the southern political process one seeks to under¬ 
stand, sooner or later the trail of inquiry leads 
to the Negro. 
4^V. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics, in State and Nation, 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Incorporated, 1949). 
41Ibid., p. 3. 
4^Ibid., p. 5. 
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Key made this observation after finding that the core of 
southern political unity was in those counties and sections 
that constituted a substantial black population (the Black 
Belt South). Thus, in these areas the maintenance of con¬ 
trol by a white minority is found. While perhaps not 
reflecting total white supremacy, the politics of the Black 
Belt South reflect the essence of the outcome of the main¬ 
tenance of the supremacy of whites over blacks. And 
while "the whites of the black belts give the South its 
dominant political tone, the character of the politics of 
individual states will vary roughly with the Negro pro¬ 
portion of the population."^3 
Key observed that two great crises had left their 
imprint on Southern political development: the Civil 
War of the 1860's and the Populist revolt of the'90's.^ 
And they also lead Havard to add the Civil Rights Movement 
from the 1950's onward as the third major crisis in 
Southern politics.^ These "crises," sum up, it seems, 
the essence of Key's argument that the race issue . . . 
is the number one problem on the Southern agenda. And it 
is this issue that has given impetus, according to Key to 
Southern regionalism and sectionalism. 
^Ibid. > p. 5 . 
^Ibid. , p. 6 . 
AS 
Havard, (ed.), The Changing Politics of the South, 
p. 23. 
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According to Key, Southern regionalism derives basically 
from the influence of the Negro. Other factors, to be 
sure, contribute to sectional character, but in the final 
analysis the peculiarities of southern white politics come 
Zi.fi 
from the impact of the black race. Of Southern section¬ 
alism Key came to the same conclusion that; "Southern sec¬ 
tionalism and the special character of southern political 
institutions have to be attributed in the main to the 
Negro."47 So we must observe with Samuel DuBois Cook that, 
"the Negro has been strangely, the prime mover in the 
politics of Dixie. 
In the final analysis, then, we have in Key's book 
a thorough discussion of politics in the context of 
Southern racial practices. His analysis was the turning 
point for social and political scientists to consider 
the political status of a black community victimized by 
racial segregation and yet existing in an environment 
determined to foster industrial growth. 
The advent of the 1954 Supreme Court decision led 
C. Vann Woodward to characterize the political adjustments 
4^Key, p. 665. 
47Ibid., p. 665. 
Samuel DuBois Cook, "Political Movements and 
Organizations in the South," in Avery Leiserson, (ed.), 
The American South in the 1960's, (New York: Praeger, 
1964), p. 131.  
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of the Fifties and Sixties as the "second Reconstruction."^ 
Indeed, it was these two decades that have shaped a New- 
New South, characterized by the removal of segregation 
in fact, the creation of a black constituency, and the 
ascendency of black persons to authoritative political 
positions. And it was within the New-New South, 
according to Simkins that "the Negro made a determined 
demand for social equality. 
The literature on the New-New South has been con¬ 
cerned with both surveys on black political life and 
approaches to studying it. Literature on black politics 
in the American South has considered Key's Southern Politics 
as the primer. Although most of the literature has con- 
^See c. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim 
Crow, p. 9 and The Burden of Southern History, (Baton Rouge : 
Louisiana State University Press, 1968) in which Woodward 
made a very interesting commentary that evoked Marx's notion 
of the tragedy turning to farce. ("The Eighteenth Brumaire 
of Louis Bonaparte," in Selected Works, New York: Interna¬ 
tional Publishers, 1968, p. 98), Woodward states: 
during the present struggle for Negro rights (the 
sixties) which might be called the Second Reconstruc¬ 
tion - though one of quite a different sort, I have 
noticed among Negro intellectuals at times a tendency 
to look back upon the First Reconstruction as if it 
were in some ways a sort of Golden Age. In this 
nostalgic view that period takes the shape of the race's 
finest hour, a time of forthright and passionate action 
with no bowing to compromise of "deliberate speed." I 
think I understand their feeling, Reconstruction will 
always have a special and powerful meaning for the Negro. 
It is undoubtedly a period full of rich and tragic and 
meaningful history, a period that should be studiously 
searched for its meanings, a period that has many 
meanings yet to yield. But I seriously doubt that it 
will ever serve satisfactory as a Golden Age - for any¬ 
body. There is too much irony mixed with the tragedy." 
^Simkins, The Everlasting South, p. 7. 
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sidered various aspects of black politics in the American 
South, it has yet to move away from Key's basic paradigm. 
With Key having defined the position of blacks in the 
American South, it seemed that the basic task left was the 
development of a useful approach to studying the black 
political experience. 
Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro in their 
study, Negroes and the New Southern Politics characterized 
the South and the Negro as the great deviant cases of 
American life.-^ Their study was concerned with the voting 
patterns among blacks in the South during the early and 
mid-sixties. They argued that the acquisition and utili¬ 
zation of the vote by blacks were revolutionary. Their 
study also gave much concern to the development of leader¬ 
ship within the black community. After analyzing their sur¬ 
vey they found three general types of Negro leaders in the 
South: "traditional leaders, who seek ameliorative action 
from whites within the system of segregation; moderates, 
whose goal is to improve the welfare of all Negroes through 
gradual desegregation; and militants, who are dedicated to 
psychic victories and the immediate destruction of racial 
52 
segregation. 
'’■'"Donald R. Matthews and James W. Pro thro, Negroes and 
the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
World, Incorporated, 1966), p. 10. 
52 
Ibid., p. 195. 
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Writing three years after the Matthew and Prothro 
study, Harry Holloway attempted to depart from Key. He 
geared his work to two assumptions that had been posited 
on the study of Southern politics: (1) that the South 
may be regarded as a traditional society that has been 
modernizing for several decades, and (2) that the Southern 
Negro may be viewed as an ethnic group comparable to ethnic 
groups in the North.^ Following the second assumption, 
Holloway suggested that black politics in the South was 
analogous to the ethnic politics of the Northern ghettoes 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Holloway went further to conclude that the prototypes of 
a modem South, were the developing metropolis; places 
such as Atlanta and Memphis; where populations are growing, 
businesses and industries are flourishing and the like. 
Holloway came to these conclusions by looking at the shifts 
in black leadership. Suggesting, that where leadership was 
once confined to ministers, it has shifted to civic leaders 
and professionals. 
Writing in Bailey's Negro Politics in America,^ 
Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. made a different point from 
Holloway on black leadership, which concludes that black 
J Harry Holloway, The Politics of the Southern Negro 
From Exclusion to Big City Organization, (New York: Random 
House, 1969), pp. 3-4. 
"^Harry A. Bailey, Jr., (ed.), Negro Politics in 
America (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, 1967). 
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leadership has not totally transferred from the hands of 
the traditional leaders. Ladd stated that: 
Negro political leadership in the South in the 
last decades of the nineteenth century and the first 
four decades of the present was not Negro selected 
leadership. The ability of these leaders to effect 
the patterning of political behavior within, their 
communities did not rest upon their control of 
institutional structures which in a major way effect 
social, political and economic life; nor did it rest 
upon a charismatic relationship with the Negro masses 
or upon the adoption of positions on race-related 
issues that articulated the deep sense of frustra? 
tions and hostility which southern Negroes felt. ^ 
Ladd also observes that the maintenance of a position of 
leadership depended on a favorable relationship with 
influential whites. One might also add to Ladd's statement 
above the two decades following the 1940's, because they 
more than any others characterized a black leadership which 
in many cases was susceptible to the influence of whites. 
Ladd proceeds further in his own book, Negro Political 
Leadership in the South, to specify the type of black 
leadership that characterized the time period he was con¬ 
cerned with. According to Ladd this leadership had been 
variously described as "Uncle Tomism," as "Conservative" 
or "Accommodating" leadership. The "Uncle Tom" was a leader 
because the white community designated him a leader and 
supported his decisions and because the black community 
deferred to the authority of the white community. This, 
-^Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. , "Negro Politics in the 
South: An Overview," in Harry A. Bailey, Jr., (ed.), Negro 
Politics in America, (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill 
Books, 1967), pp. 237-247. 
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then, was political leadership based on the support and 
sanctions of a dominant out group. ° Ladd also described 
the various voting organizations for race leadership. He 
listed three of them: Voting organizations for breaking 
down massive barriers, Voting organizations for manipula¬ 
ting the vote in behalf of certain race goals, and 
voting organizations for formal party organs; such as Negro 
Democrats and Republicans and welfare or protest organiza¬ 
tions . 
The New-New South is characterized by more than 
just a shift in the structure of Southern institutions. 
According to Leslie W. Dunbar: it was with the beginning 
of the sit-in movement in Greensboro, North Carolina in 
1960 that the "mind" of blacks became of conscious interest 
to white Southerners, in the sense that the active awareness 
that had begun among blacks forced the Southern political 
options to include black values and desires.^ 
The survey of literature up to this point has 
attempted to suggest that one way to analyze the problem 
of black politics in the American South is to look at the 
JDEverett Carll Ladd, Jr., Negro Political Leadership 
in the South, (New York: Atheneum, 1969)', pp. 115-116. 
See also Myrdal, An American Dilemma, pp. 34-36. 
"^Leslie w. Dunbar, "The Changing Mind of the South," 
26 Journal of Politics (February, 1964): pp. 3 - 12. 
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changing strategies for regional development and the poli¬ 
tical status of blacks in the region. New South strategy 
was an effort to attract industries and that they were 
chiefly successful in bringing into the South certain 
kinds of industries, particularly textiles and lumbering. 
However, the advent of industrialization did not close the 
gap between regional development in the South and the 
rest of the country. The development of small northeastern 
industrial companies into giant, international combines 
heighten the expectations of New South development. It 
was expected that when these companies entered the region 
their rationalist approach would upset traditional race 
relations and other more reactionary Southern "traditions," 
such as anti-unionism. It is out of this context then, 
that this study has been selected, which allows one to 
look at the traditional expectations of New Southern 
developmental strategy, the evolution of industrial growth, 
and the purposeful activity of blacks. 
Ill 
We will now turn to a survey of the literature that 
has been done on multinational corporations. Of particular 
concern is a definition of multinational corporations, the 
functions of multinational corporations, and the dangers 
-38- 
and advantages of multinational corporations. 
There are several definitions of the multinational 
corporation. Some have defined it as a company whose 
foreign sales have reached a ratic of twenty-five percent 
or more in total sales. The United Nations' Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs suggests that the term "multi¬ 
national" indicates that a corporation or enterprise is 
involved in more than one nation. Certain minimum quali¬ 
fying criteria such as assets, sales, production, employment 
or profits of foreign branches and affiliates determines 
CO 
the activity of such corporations. George Modelski 
observes that multinational corporations are giant cor¬ 
porations. His definition is congruent with that of the 
United Nations: He suggests that a multinational 
corporation: 
operates extractive and manufacturing facilities 
in several countries, either in a loose, decentra¬ 
lized manner, is on a tight, centralized way. It 
employs a considerable labor force, has extensive 
marketing arrangements in many countries; and deals 
with a myriad of customers to governments and other 
large organizations. Its two distinguishing features 
are absolute size and operation in a variety of net¬ 
work layers of the world (local, national, and global) 
in a way which blurs the differences between them _ 
and allows opportunities for extensive coordination. y 
5®See United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Multinational Corporations in World Development, 
(Nfew York"! Praeger Publishers , 1974) , pp . 1-2. 
59 George Modelski, "Multinational Business," in 
Modelski (ed.), Multinational Corporations and World Order 
(Beverly Hills : Sage Publications , 1972) , p. TT. 
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Modelski observed two distinguishing features of a multi¬ 
national corporation which he suggests are the key to its 
central direction. According to Christopher Tugendhat, 
however large the corporation is or however many subsid¬ 
iaries it may have, all of its operations are coordinated 
from the center.^ 
The current literature on multinational corporations 
finds their behavior much different from the expectations 
of the New Southerners. It suggests an analysis of multi¬ 
national corporations as they perform globally and domesti¬ 
cally. The expectations that multinational corporations 
would disturb "traditions," i.e., race relations, becomes 
strained when these corporations are analyzed from these 
two features. 
Globally, multinational corporations have been 
found to operate as autonomous entities. They provide the 
capital means for abstracting natural resources. Their 
role is best observed in underdeveloped countries. While 
abstracting natural resources, multinational corporations 
have found ways to minimize taxes placed on them, and attract 
cheap labor. In addition, multinational corporations have 
maintained technologial dominance over underdeveloped coun¬ 
tries. These corporations have contributed to increases in 
6^See Christopher Tugendhat, The Multinationals, 
(New York: Random House, 1972), p. 11. 
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the Gross National Product (GNP) of underdeveloped 
countries, but have done very little to ease underemploy¬ 
ment and poverty. Richard J. Barnett and Ronald E. Muller 
suggests that the basic problem is to be found in the 
multinational corporations' model of development. Barnett 
and Muller suggests that, while advancementand wealth are 
granted to the industrial elite, persistent poverty is main- 
tained against the many. Furthermore, the commodities 
that are produced in foreign countries are shipped to 
countries least in need; the rich and developed countries. 
In the final analysis, while multinational corporations 
operate to abstract natural resources and develop technical 
growth in underdeveloped countries, they do not promote 
efforts to remove social and economic constraints faced 
by those entities. 
The literature suggests that the role of multination¬ 
al corporations are just as acute domestically as they 
are globally. Oftentimes, multinational corporations are 
responsible for the development of settlement towns. In 
such cases as these they control the entire political life 
of the community. They often are the largest employer and 
taxpayer. Generally, multinational corporations are 
fil 
See Richard J. Barnett and Ronald E. Muller, 
Global Reach, The Power of the Multinational Corporations, 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), pp. 14 and 375 
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interested in tranquil situations, such that the social 
and political character of domestic communities do not 
retard their performance. While they have been open to 
employing members of various ethnic and racial groups, they 
have generally maintained caution about upsetting tradi¬ 
tions . 
Literature on multinational corporations suggests 
the need to analyze multinational corporations in the con¬ 
duct of their relations within a total environment. We 
have reviewed the role of multinational corporations both 
globally and domestically. The literature suggests similar 
performance in both situations. In the main, while pro¬ 
moting capital development, multinational corporations 
do not upset traditional social, economic and political 
patterns. Finally, this survey suggests that if we are 
to come to terms with the status of blacks in Bogalusa, 
Louisiana, we must understand the relationship between 
that status and industrial development up to the advent of 
the town's only multinational corporation, the Crown 
Zellerbach Corporation. 
The entire survey has presented literature that has 
been done on development in the American South in general, 
black politics in particular and multinational corporations. 
It has attempted to suggest a framework for studying black 
politics in the American South by analyzing the relation¬ 
ship of black political life and industrial development in 
the American South. 
CHAPTER III 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BOGALUSA, LOUISIANA IN THE 
NEW SOUTH AND CROWN ZELLERBACH CORPORATION 
This chapter is a historical survey of the develop¬ 
ment of Bogalusa, Louisiana from a mill town settlement 
to the advent of the Crown Zellerbach Corporation. 
Bogalusa was settled in 1906. Two extensive historical 
accounts have been done on its history. The bulk of the 
information in this chapter is abstracted from these 
two accounts. The first was done by one of the persons 
responsible for settling Bogalusa, Charles Waterhouse 
Goodyear. The second was done by Amy Quick. The 
Goodyear account was compiled from memory and notes he 
kept on the settlement from the first day he set foot 
on the white sands of the "Bogue Lusa" creek. While the 
Quick account was originally done for her Masters thesis 
■'■Charles Waterhouse Goodyear, Bogalusa Story, 
(Buffalo, New York: William J. Keller, Incorporated, 1950). 
^Amy Quick, "The History of Bogalusa,, The"Magic 
City of Louisiana," 20 Louisiana Historical Quarterly 
(January 1946): pp. 73 - 201. 
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at Louisiana State University. Other information was 
abstracted from newspaper articles and genealogical 
documents. 
I 
Charles Waterhouse Goodyear told his story as "the 
Goodyear story." In Goodyear's own words: 
they came late, these men dreaming the urgent, 
restless dreams of accomplishment and of pyramiding 
wealth. They were long finding their new abundant 
virgin forest treasure, though its southernmost 
boundary was scarcely fifty miles from New Orleans. 
The southeastern Louisiana country where they 
found it had, in the beginning, been Choctaw 
country. The Choctaw Indians, hostile and shrewd, 
had guarded it long and well and when they left, 
they left it as they had found it - a forest 
wilderness of magnificent expense, its riches 
waiting to be tapped.^ 
The Goodyear brothers came to "Bogue Lusa" in the Fall of 
1905. Charles was fifty-six and Frank Henry was fifty-two. 
They were the sons of Bradley Goodyear, a country doctor in 
Graton, New York.^ Charles Goodyear, who earned a law de¬ 
gree in Buffalo, New York, and at one time served as 
Assistant District Attorney and District Attorney of Erie 
County, New York; married Ella Conger, the daughter of a 
successful country banker."* Charles was the prime mover of 
3 
Goodyear, p. 1. 
4 
Thomas T. Taber, III, The Goodyears : An Empire in 
the Hemlocks, (Muncy, Pennsylvania: 1971), p. 50. 
^Ibid., p. 502. 
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the Goodyear venture into the lumber industry. Besides 
holdings and capital investments in Buffalo and Reading, 
New York; Charles and Frank also were tied very closely to 
the lumber industry in the State of Pennsylvania. The 
literature does not give any extensive information on 
Charles and Frank’s parents, nor do we find information 
on their financial holdings in Pennsylvania. Charles Good¬ 
year does not discuss these matters in his book. 
For their lumber venture in Louisiana and Mississippi 
g 
the Goodyear brothers invested fifteen-million dollars. 
Most of which had been accumulated from lumber and coal 
enterprises in Pennsylvania.^ And according to Charles 
Goodyear, another three million dollars of capital stock 
was provided by "Pennsylvania Capitalists;" the Hamlins and 
Crarys and by Charles I. James, "scion" of an aristocratic 
O 
Maryland family. 
The townsite for the Goodyear venture in the State 
of Louisiana was located in Washington Parish, which was 
created on March 6, 1819. Washington Parish is located 
in the southeastern section of Louisiana, laying east of 
^Goodyear, p. 47. 
^Ibid., p. 47. 
8Ibid., p. 47. 
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the Mississippi River and north of Lake Ponchartrain. 
Washington Parish is a member of the commonly known 
"Florida Parishes." On the north, the Parish is bound 
by the State of Mississippi; on the east by the Pearl 
River; on the west by Tangipahoa Parish and the south 
by St. Tammany Parish.^ 
The townsite that was selected was the "abundant 
virgin forest treasure" that Charles and Frank Goodyear 
came upon in the Fall of 1905. However, after the postal 
authorities preferred a one-word name, the designation 
"Bogalusa" was used. The name was even registered with 
the Patent Office as a trademark and was used as the 
brand name of the lumber that was shipped from the site. 
Five months after the townsite was selected the 
Great Southern Lumber Company was organized, along with 
completion of plans for the construction of a huge saw¬ 
mill. The Goodyear brothers also formed a Board of 
Directors for their newly formed enterprises. Frank and 
Charles were selected president and vice-president, 
respectively. Charles I. James became second vice-president. 
Q 
Quick, p. 73. For a historical account on Washing¬ 
ton Parish, see the Honorable Prentiss B. Carter, "The 
History of Washington Parish, Louisiana, as compiled from 
the Records and Traditions," 14 Louisiana Historical Quarterly, 
(January - October 1931). 
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One, F. A. Lehs became secretary and treasurer. William 
Sullivan became general manager of the lumber operations, 
and A. Conger Goodyear, Charles' son was appointed 
purchasing agent and was the first of the younger genera¬ 
tion of Goodyears to become identified with the family 
business interest."^ The Great Southern Lumber Company 
was organized as a Pennsylvania corporation, which at 
that time, had an authorized capital of twelve million 
11 
dollars. 
The Goodyears hired one Harvey Murdock, a landscape 
architect of New York to draft plans for the city of 
Bogalusa. Murdock had planned several real-estate develop¬ 
ments on Long Island and New York City. The idea of a 
lumber town being systematically planned was uncommon. 
Such planning had only occurred in mining towns. According 
to Charles Goodyear, "it was never the intention of the 
builders of Bogalusa to create what would become a ghost 
town after sawmill operations came to an end with the ex- 
12 
haustion of the timber supply." In its final draft, the 
Murdock plan showed three residential areas; a business 
■^Goodyear, p. 73. 
■^Quick, p. 96. 
1 9 Goodyear, p. 75. 
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section ; plots for public buildings and several parks, 
with the largest being Goodyear Park. To the south of Bogue 
Lusa creek 850 homes were rented to company employees. 
About 150 acres were secure for the sawmill plant and log 
pond, to separate the residential section from the 
colored quarters. This was done in an attempt to avert 
racial conflicts as much as possible. "There had been 
lynchings of Negroes in the Parish, and probably 40 per- 
13 
cent of the city's population would be colored." 
The settlement of Bogalusa was one of the classic 
examples of the New South strategy for development. 
Moreover, it was settled by men and women from the Northeast; 
many settlers came from the Buffalo, New York area and the 
State of Pennsylvania. This settlement of Northeasterners 
was a distinct contrast from the earlier settlers in 
Washington Parish. The early settlers to the Parish came 
from Kentucky, the Carolinas, Georgia, Virginia and 
Tennessee, and were of largely white Anglo Saxon Protestant 
stock. They were small farmers; owning four or five 
slaves.^ 
The organization of the Great Southern Lumber Company 
was the first of its kind in the deep South. Which not only 
made the South valuable for its natural resources, but 
needless to say, added to the capital assets that the Goodyears 
13Ibid., p. 76. 
-^Bogalusa - 1914 - 1964, Golden Jubilee, Commemora¬ 
ting the 50th Anniversary of the Incorporation of Bogalusa, 
(1964). 
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had in Pennsylvania and New York. The lumber company 
and sawmill (soon to be the world's largest) were indeed 
examples of what the New South strategy could do for 
Southern development. Amy Quick summed up the settle¬ 
ment in Bogalusa quite well: 
The founding of Bogalusa was to become a romance, 
not only of Louisiana industry, but of American 
enterprise. It showed to the world what unlimited 
capital backed by long experience could do in the 
way of city planning and city building. So well was 
the effort planned and timed that it was like 
winding up a mechanical toy and touching the spring! 
Here were built mills - and planer mills with all 
accessories, fireproof throughout, with concrete 
foundations and walls and roofs of iron; with machinery 
foundations planned to last until the final log was 
cut. Before a wheel was turned, Bogalusa was planned 
for forty years to come. And even then they said, 
Bogalusa will live on, the center of a thriving 
agricultural country and the home of varied indus¬ 
tries, which will be provided by the forethought 
of its founders .-*-5 
Historically, much of the agricultural development has been 
done in other towns of the Parish. Towns such as Franklinton 
(the Parish seat; twenty-one miles from Bogalusa, Enon, 
Mt. Herman, Angie and Vanado, to name a few, are rich in 
crop production and dairy farming; while Bogalusa has been 
the center of industrial development. 
The Great Southern Lumber Company was established in 
1906 and produced lumber under the brand name "Bogalusa." 
The Great Southern Lumber Company's primary subsidiary was 
the Great Northern Railroad. Besides providing the rail 
business for the town, it also operated the company stores 
15 Quick, pp. 94-95. 
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between 1906 and 1914. The Great Southern also had other 
subsidiaries; the Southern Distillate and Fibre Company, 
Colonial Creosoting Company, Bogalusa Turpentine Plant 
and the Pine Tree Inn. In 1916 a kraft paper mill, the 
Bogalusa Paper Company was established to turn the waste 
from the lumber company into paper. It too was a subsidiary 
of the Great Southern Lumber Company, and was the largest 
paper mill in the South at that time. 
In 1928 a five thousand dollar plant of the Gaylord 
Container Company was begun in Bogalusa.^ And in May, 
1937 the Gaylord Company and Bogalusa Paper Company merged. 
Though by 1938 the entire operation was in Gaylord's 
possession, including its subsidiary, the New Orleans 
Great Northern Railroad; which later became the Gulf, Mobile 
and Ohio Railroad. This industrial development from 
1914 to 1938 brought forth the "magic city," the creation 
of the Goodyear lumber interests. And as Amy Quick recorded, 
it was fittingly called "the New South's Young City of 
Destiny. 
Bogalusa was incorporated on July 4, 1914 and its 
mayor was William Sullivan. Sullivan had served since 
1906 as the manager of the lumber operations. He had 
become the most revered person in the town, and affectionately 
16Ibid., p. 130. 
17Ibid., p. 107. 
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became known as the "Father of Bogalusa." Sullivan was 
elected mayor by acclamation! Sullivan was responsible for 
the reforestration that enabled Bogalusa to grow from 
a mill town settlement to a municipality of 11,000 by 
1914. The growth of the city was steady between 1906 
and 1914. (See Appendix A). It established a commission 
form of government. Both industrially and population 
wise the town had grown, beyond expectation. Unlike other 
lumber settlements that had been developed by the Goodyears 
and William Sullivan in Pennsylvania and New York, they 
were determined to make this one grow. 
Black people came to Bogalusa as unskilled laborers. 
Black people were a common commodity around lumber camps 
between the turn of the twentieth century and the first 
three decades. As workers they were to participate in 
a number of major union organizing efforts. This was 
particularly the case in Bogalusa. One well-known 
incident of union organizing was recorded by Goodyear. In 
the summer of 1919 sawyers and filers of Bogalusa joined 
the carpenters union and other workers joined a timber 
workers' local which was seventy-five percent black. This 
provoked mobilization of local white vigilantes. They 
ransacked the home of Sol Dacus, a black vice-president 
of the timber workers' local. Dacus fled into the Pearl 
River swamps and has not been seen or heard from since. 
-51- 
The vigilantes then attacked the union headquarters in 
which the president of the Bogalusa Central Trades 
18 
Assembly and three other unionists were killed. 
19 
Union organizing disappeared from Bogalusa until 1933. 
In its public brochures, promoting Bogalusa as a 
good town to settle in, the "colored section" was given 
little regard, if any. One of its brochures printed 
in the 1920's only had a sentence on "Bogalusa's colored 
section." - everything is done to keep our Negro citizens 
20 healthy, happy and productive." Mention is not made 
of the fact that a Black man gave the sections of the 
town their names. Since the "colored section" was called 
just that, or the "colored quarters" there was no need to 
give it any other name. However, of the sections where 
whites lived, names were given. And since he was a grocery 
delivery man, he had no need to name the "colored section," 
18 
See Goodyear, pp. 163-166; and Tindall, The Emergence 
of the New South, 1913 - 1945, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1967), p. 338. 
l-^See Herbert R. Norhtrup, The Negro in the Paper 
Industry, (Philadelphia: Univeristy of Pennsylvania Press, 
19"6T(7 P- 96. 
20 Department of Publicity, Great Southern Lumber 
Company, Bogalusa: The Cities of Families and Functions, 
(Bogalusa, LouisianaT"! 
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because he did not deliver groceries there. Amy Quick 
recorded how the names were derived: 
the rather picturesque section names were given 
to Bogalusa by a Negro delivery man, one Henry 
Fisher. Henry was made head delivery boy at 
Bogalusa stores, and he complained that service 
was slowed down because it was hard for the boys 
to find out where the customers lived. He devised 
a system of stacking packages in piles and calling 
sections to the dragman after the fashion used in 
railroad stations. Dragmen soon learned that 
"Official Quarters" meant the handsome Sullivan Man¬ 
sion on South Border Drive. "Little Buffalo" or 
"Buffalotown" meant the residential district just 
south of the mill houses, which was occupied by 
company "higher ups" from Buffalo, New York; 
"Jew-town" referred to the Columbia street 
section where a few small stores were operated by 
Jewish merchants; Richardsontown had already been 
named; Adamstown and Denhamtown received their 
names from the families located there. Henry asked 
LeRoy Pierce to name his own section, to which 
Mr. Pierce gave the title Pleasant Hill (now 
dubbed simply "the Hill"). "Shacktown," called 
today, by the more euphomous designation, Lake- 
view, was Henry's masterpiece - said Henry, 
"Ain't nothin' but shacks out towards the river 
so we'll jes' call that place Shacktown."21 
There is to be found no other recording in the historical 
tracks, indicating some type of contribution by blacks in 
Bogalusa's early history. Their roles were consistent with 
the prescirption of the New South strategy: an unskilled 
labor force. 
The race problem was indeed tied to the industrial 
situation in Bogalusa. The Goodyears and the Great Southern 
Lumber Company provided the services, owned the utilities, 
21 Quick, p. 108. 
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houses, the land, and virtually the town itself. Their 
control totally dominated the town. Indeed blacks were 
kept in their place, they only participated as unskilled 
laborers in the lumber industry. 
The advent of the Gaylord Corporation only brought 
a major shift in union relations. Gaylord welcomed the 
unions and unlike the Great Southern management it 
made no effort to fill the role as the direct community 
leader. Thus, it would take no position about resolving 
the race problem, which in the two previous decades lead 
to the murder and lynching of blacks. However, during 
Gaylord's existence in the town, blacks also participated 
as unskilled laborers. Gaylord's strategy for maintaining 
its dominance was a little different from the Great 
Southern Lumber Company. It turned the community leader¬ 
ship over to white unionists and the white middle class. 
These groups ran the politics of the town and made it 
highly unionized. They represented both the discriminatory 
policies of the Gaylord Corporation and their interests 
as caretakers of a racially segregated southern town. 
Not only did blacks not enjoy the type of life as did 
whites, but Gaylord placed them in yard and common labor 
jobs. They also had to participate in separate unions. 
By 1955 not only had Gaylord failed to change the relations 
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between blacks and whites in Bogalusa, its operation 
had fallen prey to mismanagement and corruption. On 
November 30, 1955, it merged with the Crown Zellerbach 
22 Corporation of San Francisco, California. 
The survey up to this point has been an attempt to 
describe the salient historical developments in Bogalusa, 
Louisiana. The point that the author has tried to make 
is that the development of Bogalusa, Louisiana is indicative 
of the New South strategy. Northeastern capitalists settled 
the town to exploit its timber resource and thus maintained a 
hold on its development. Blacks were certainly considered 
"alien" and "menial," and only participated as unskilled 
laborers. The major industrial corporations up to the 
Crown Zellerbach Corporation maintained the same position 
on the race question in Bogalusa. We even noted the period 
in which total political control was placed in the hands 
of the white community to do as it wished particularly 
with Blacks. The remainder of this chapter will consider 
in more detail the Crown Zellerbach Corporation. 
99 
See Bogalusa Daily News,(November 30, 1955) - 
See also Herbert R. Northrup. The Negro In the Paper 
Industry, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1969), p. 97. 
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II 
According to the 1975 edition of Moody's Handbook 
of Common Stocks, Crown Zellerbach is currently the second 
largest domestic paper manufacturer. It's main pulp and 
paper mills are in the Pacific Northeast, British Columbia, 
and Louisiana, in addition to 3.4 million acres of timber- 
land. Twenty-three percent of its total production is in 
container board, twenty-nine percent is in business and 
converting papers, seventeen percent is in newsprint, fif¬ 
teen percent is in other printing papers, while wood 
products accotants for eighteen percent of sales. The 
corporation headquarters is in San Francisco, California 
and it has 32,980 stockholders. 
The Crown Zellerbach Corporation was formed in 1870. 
A German immigrant, one Anthony Zellerbach started a one- 
man system for distributing paper in San Francisco, 
California. From this small beginning, Zellerbach with his 
son Isadore developed a $27 million paper enterprise by 
1925. This enterprise had been organized under two names, 
A. Zellerbach and Sons and Zellerbach Paper Company. The 
former with business only in the State of California. 
2^See Stanley Berkson, (ed.), Moody's Handbook of 
Common Stocks, Fall 1975 Edition, (New York: Moody's 
Investors Service, Incorporated, 1975). 
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By the time the latter name was acquired, offices were 
opened in Portland, Oregon; Seattle, Washington; and 
Salt Lake City, Utah. By the early nineteen-twenties, 
the Zellerbach Paper Company had become the major paper 
distributor in the West. "A holding company, called the 
Zellerbach Corporation was created in 1924 to take over the 
subsidiaries, leaving the Zellerbach Paper Company to 
0 / 
fulfill its primary function as a distributor." 
The major turn in the history of the Zellerbach 
Corporation was in 1928. The corporation merged with its 
nearest "competitor," the Crown Williamette Paper Company. 
The Zellerbach Corporation was the principal instrument 
for the merger. Its name, therefore, was changed to 
Crown Zellerbach. The shares of common stock were evenly 
divided between the former stockholders of Crown Williamette 
and the Zellerbach Corporation.^ With the merger, Crown 
Zellerbach represented 56 percent of the Pacific Coast 
pulp and paper industry's manufacturing capacity, with assets 
totalling $96 million. Isadore Zellerbach became its 
president. One, Louis Bloch, who was general manager of 
the Crown Williamette operation, became chairman of the 
Board of Directors. Isadore's sons J. D. and Harold were 
^See R. 0. Hunt, Pulp, Paper and Pioneers: The Story 
of Crown Zellerbach Corporation, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, February, 1961), p. 18. 
25 Ibid. , p. 20. 
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also officers in the new corporation. J. D. became 
executive vice president and president of the Zellerbach 
Paper Company; a subsidiary of the newly merged corporation. 
The Zellerbach family remained at the head of the corpora¬ 
tion. Isadore turned the presidency over to J. D. in 1938; 
who remained at that post eighteen years, he retired and 
became chairman of the Board in 1956. 
Further and decisive expansion of the Crown Zellerbach 
Corporation took place from 1945 throughout the 1950's. 
Emphasis was placed on greater diversification of products. 
A contract was signed with Times Incorporated to produce 
and sell coated magazine papers. The corporation also 
ventured into British Columbia, to develop a mill and 
acquire the Canadian Western Lumber Company. This effort 
launched Crown Zellerbach into the manufacture and sale of 
lumber and plywood. In the mid 1950's it made a major move 
from the West Coast. A merger with the Gaylord Container 
Corporation of St. Louis, Missouri in 1955 put Crown 
Zellerbach into the container box field on a full time 
and integrated basis. Gaylord Container was incorporated 
as a division of Crown Zellerbach Corporation. The merger 
with Gaylord also gave Crown Zellerbach exclusive owner¬ 
ship and control over Gaylord's plant in Bogalusa. 
Since 1955 Crown Zellerbach Corporation has become a 
multinational corporation, with foreign affiliates and 
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subsidiaries all over the world. Crown Zellerbach 
International, Incorporated is responsible for all the 
Crown Zellerbach investments outside the United States. 
The international division covers the following areas: 
the Crown Zellerbach Canada Limited in Vancouver, 
British Columbia; Van Gelder Papier in Amsterdam the 
Netherlands; Laja Crown South America Papeles Especiales 
in Chile; Crown Zellerbach Panama Incorporated in San- 
turce, Puerto Rico; Norsky Pacific Steamship Company, 
Limited (a shipping service between the United States 
and foreign ports); Mitsui Zellerbach K. K. in Tokyo, 
Japan; Sigma, South America, in San Salvador, El Salvador; 
and Covertidora del Papel, South America in San Jose, 
Costa Rica. 
The Crown Zellerbach Corporation has five major 
domestic subsidiaries and affiliated companies: the 
St. Francisiville Paper Company in St. Francisiville, 
Louisiana; the Crown Simpson Corporation in Fairhaven, 
California; the Waterway Terminals Company in Astoria 
and Portland, Oregon and Pasco, Washington; the Western 
Transportation Company on the Columbia River; the Forest 
Terminals Corporation in Long Beach, California; and the 
Cal-Pacific Manufacturing Company throughout the State of 
California. The Crown Zellerbach Corporation has pulp 
and paper mills in the States of California, Ohio, Louisiana, 
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Washington, and Oregon. And outside the United States in 
Canada, Chile and the Netherlands. The corporation has 
shipping container converting plants in the States of 
California, Georgia, Ohio, Louisiana, Illinois, Texas, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Delaware, Michigan, 
North Carolina, Florida and Missouri. And in British 
Columbia, and Canada. It has plastic plants in the .States 
of New Jersey and Missouri. 
The Crown Zellerbach Corporation has packaging 
plants in Indiana, California, Delaware, Texas, Oregon 
and Missouri; in addition to the Netherlands and Canada. 
For the exception of Louisiana, Crown's lumber mills are 
located in California, Oregon, Washington and British 
Columbia. And in addition to Washington and British 
Columbia it operates a plywood plant in Louisiana. Crown 
Zellerbach has poles and piling plants in Mississippi, 
Alabama, Louisiana and Oregon. Its managed forests are 
in British Columbia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Washington, 
and Oregon. Its chemical plants are in Louisiana, 
Oregon and Washington. The main research facilities of 
Crown Zellerbach are in Washington, California and Oregon. 
The corporation also has ink plants in Oregon and Missouri. 
The Zellerbach Paper Company, which still operates as a 
distributor is located entirely on the West Coast, 
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including Hawaii. 
The Crown Zellerbach Corporation engages in 
four major kinds of activities: (1) pulp, paper and 
paper products; (2) containers and packages; (3) distribu¬ 
tion; and (4) wood products. It produces newsprint and 
coated and uncoated papers, directory papers, business and 
converting papers and multiwall paper. Its containers and 
packages are for bakery and frozen foods, and rigid plastic 
packaging such as margarine tubs and lids. Crown distributes 
paper, and office supplies for more than 2,600 manufactures 
on the West coast. And it produces lumber and plywood for 
construction and building materials. Crown Zellerbach 
also distributes and transmits poles and piling. 
Along with the fact that Crown Zellerbach had 
$1,758,120,000 in net sales and $74,490,000 in net income 
in 1975 (See Appendix B) the above is the result of its 
multinational character and its dominance as the second 
largest paper company in the United States. Its position 
in Bogalusa, Louisiana is enhanced by the fact that it has 
three operations located there; a primary pulp and paper 
mill, a shipping container converting plant, and a chemical 
plant. The number of Crown's operations in Bogalusa is 
surpassed only by those in St. Louis, Missouri, four 
operations are located there. 
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To the white community in Bogalusa the advent 
of the Crown Zellerbach Corporation was a new "lease 
on life." Immediately after taking control of the 
Bogalusa plant, the Crown Zellerbach Corporation revita¬ 
lized the way of life that whites enjoyed. As stated 
above, it took a "hands off" position on the race problem. 
For its prime concern was its expansion as a national 
and multinational corporation. From 1955 to 1965 its 
policies of racial discrimination in its Bogalusa plant 
and its acceptance of racial segregation and injustice 
were the dominant themes. 
It is precisley the role that the Crown Zellerbach 
Corporation played from 1965 to 1975 that characterized 
its performance in Bogalusa, Louisiana, not just as some 
petty business enterprise, but as a multinational corpora¬ 
tion that functioned to shape the political life of the 
town. It is also the radical criticism that was registered 
by the black community, starting in 1965 that crystallized 
the character of the Crown Zellerbach Corporation. 
This chapter has treated a historical survey of Bogalusa, 
Louisiana and the Crown Zellerbach Corporation.The following 
chapters will analyze the Civil Rights Movement in Bogalusa 
from 1965 to 1975. Included therein will be an analysis 
of Crown's relationship to the Civil Rights Movement. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN BOGALUSA, 
LOUISIANA: BLACK POLITICS AND THE 
NEW-NEW SOUTH 
Now we turn our attention to the relationship of 
the Crown Zellerbach Corporation to the Civil Rights 
Movement in Bogalusa, Louisiana. Of primary concern is an 
account of the activities that blacks engaged in to end 
segregation in Bogalusa. Questions on leadership and or¬ 
ganization are raised as key factors in the development 
of the Movement. Attention is also given to the role 
of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), (the only 
national Civil Rights organization that participated in 
the Bogalusa Movement). More detailed points are made 
about the Crown Zellerbach Corporation and its role during 
this period. 
The general activities on the part of blacks, from 
the mid-1950's to the mid 1960's have been characterized 
as the Civil Rights Movement.^ It ushered in a new be- 
^For a characterization of the Civil Rights Movement, see Lester 
A. Sobel, Civil Rights, 1960-66, (New York: Facts on File, Incorporated, 
1967); Steven D. Price, Civil Rights, 1967-68, (New York: Facts on File, 
Incorporated, 1973) ; Milton D. Morris, The Politics of Black America, (New 
York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1975), pp. 221-227; and Lucius J. Barker 
and Jesse J. McCorry, Jr. Black Americans and the Political System, (Cam¬ 
bridge: Winthrop Publishers, Incorporated, 1976), pp. 216-235. 
-62- 
-63- 
ginning in the political life of blacks in the American 
South. And more than any other set of activities, by any 
other people in the United States, the Civil Rights Movement 
illustrated the first radical execution of the basic elements 
of the American paradigm. Indeed the ideas of the Consti¬ 
tution and the Declaration of Independence shaped blacks 
ideological notions about integration, desegregation and 
their entire struggle for democratic rights in the United 
States.^ 
We may date the beginning of the Civil Rights Move¬ 
ment in Bogalusa, Louisiana from 1965. The advent of the 
Civil Rights Movement in Bogalusa was a new beginning in 
the political life of blacks there. Prior to this period, 
life in the town was characterized by a clear dichotomy 
between blacks and whites. Blacks existed in a constant 
state of segregation from the primary function of the 
town's affairs. Constraints on black participation were 
the same in Bogalusa, Louisiana as elsewhere in the American 
South during this period. Blacks were not permitted to 
participate in any phase of city government. They were 
barred from employment in the retail industry. They were 
2 
See Sheldon Wolin, "Paradigms and Political Theories," 
in Preston King and B. C. Parekh, (eds.), Politics and Experi¬ 
ence, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968). 
-*See Martin Luther King, Jr. , Where Do We Go From 
Here : Chaos or Community? (New York: Harper and Row, 
Publishers, 1967). ^ 
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no t allowed in the local white restaurants and similar 
establishments. Jim Crow signs regulated their use of the 
charity hospital and the public health clinic. The only 
meaningful jobs held by blacks were in the teaching and 
preaching professions. While at the Crown Zellerbach 
Corporation, racial discrimination was rampart, thus rele¬ 
gating blacks to the lowest paying jobs. In short, Jim 
Crow laws and the Ku Klux Klan represented both the law 
and the order. Some changes, however, in the basic social 
relations in Bogalusa were to come in the Spring of 1965. 
The Movement that began in Bogalusa, was a dual 
movement. First, against the caretakers of a racially 
segregated town, which systematically prevented blacks 
from participation, and second, against the Crown Zellerbach 
Corporation. 
From Acquiescence to Activism: The Rise of 
Militant Leadership and Organization 
In the Spring of 1964, staff workers from the Congress 
of Racial Equality (CORE) entered Bogalusa to conduct a voter 
registration drive with the Bogalusa Civic and Voters League, 
which at the same time was an organization whose purpose was 
to promote voter registration in Bogalusa. Bogalusa was one 
of the many untested areas in the South. CORE, therefore 
sent a letter to the mayor, Jesse H. Cutrer, Jr., stating 
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it wanted to come in and integrate.^ The mayor 
and the city council called in the officers of the Voters 
League and asked them to go and talk to CORE. However, 
according to Mrs. Gayle Jenkins, who was later to become 
secretary of the League, "they paid them to go and talk 
to CORE and ask them not to come in."’’ The refusal to 
let CORE in was supposedely attributable to the black 
leaders' desire to from a biracial commission to resolve 
g 
the problems faced by blacks. 
The series of events that are cited as the begin¬ 
ning of the Civil Rights Movement in Bogalusa began in 
January, 1965. Before CORE was asked to come back into 
Bogalusa, a small group of white "liberals" and "moderates" 
made an attempt to avert the inevitable increase in the 
antagonisms between the black and white communities. 
These "liberals" and "moderates" included the editor/publish¬ 
er of the Daily News, Lou Majors; owner and manager of the 
local WBOX radio station, Ralph Blumberg; and the rector 
of the St. Matthew Episcopal Church; the Reverend Bruce 
Shepherd. This group had invited former Arkansas Congressman 
was unable to obtain a copy of CORE'S letter to mayor 
Jesse H. Cutrer, Jr. However, reference is made of the letter 
a year later in the Bogalusa Daily News, See March 15,1965 
and March 23, 1965, and in personal interviews. 
^Personal Interview, Mrs. Gayle Jenkins, June 18, 1976. 
g 
However the Commission was never formed. 
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Brooks Hays, considered a liberal by Southern standards, 
to discuss the 1964 Civil Rights Act. After threats from 
the Ku Klux Klan, Hays' speech was cancelled. The Klan 
was able to demand respect from the white "liberal" and 
"moderate" community, because of its size in numbers. At 
the time it had, perhaps, the highest percentage of active 
Klansmen of any city in the South.^ With its headquarters 
across the street from City Hall, it had easy access to the 
mayor. Blumberg was subsequently forced to sell his radio 
station and leave town. While Majors and shepherd even¬ 
tually gave in to the segregationists demands. A year after 
leaving Bogalusa, Blumberg told The New York Times "that 
the Bogalusa Daily News, which fought the Klan for a while 
gave in and now publishes news in the slanted way desired 
by the Klan."® 
When the white "liberals" and "moderates" were 
forced to leave the racial issue alone, the mayor was 
willing to call CORE back into the city and give sanction 
to a day of testing for compliance with the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. 
^See The National Observer, July 26, 1965. See also 
Vera Rony, "Bogalusa: The Economics of Tragedy." 13 Dissent 
(May - June 1966): p. 237. 
g 
See The New York Times, January 6, 1966. 
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In January 1965, Andrew Moses decided that the 
time was right to ask CORE to come back into Bogalusa. 
However, according to Mrs. Jenkins, the mayor had told 
Moses to make the request. CORE did come in, under the 
stipulation of a brief stay to help test the public 
accommodations sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
Mrs. Jenkins described what transpired when CORE came 
We went back to New Orleans and talked to Ronnie 
Moore (CORE's Field Director in Louisiana) and 
asked them to come in. They were going to come 
in on a Thursday. We then went back and met with 
the city council. They wanted them to come one day 
and then go back. But blacks felt that this was 
trickery; why would they integrate for one day? 
Everything was going to be peaceful; the kids were 
let out of school to go and integrate that day. 
They had their state troopers in and the television. 
They did go to the movies and all the lunch counters, 
everything was peaceful that day. The next day all 
hell broke loose. The Klan was beating kids. There 
was no integration. Everybody were going to jail; 
people's homes were being shot in; crosses were being 
burned in the streets. There was no integration; 
but something that the white man was using to trick 
us again.° 
This violence and harassment frightened the League's officers 
into calling for suspension of the tests and the departure 
of CORE from Bogalusa. This led to dissension and splits 
among the leadership. Moses quit, because he did not want 
to be involved after the people decided to go back downtown 
to integrate. Mrs.Jenkins describes the scenario that 
9 
Personal Interview, Mrs. Gayle Jenkins, June 18, 1976. 
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that followed Moses' resignation: "then we elected 
McClurie Sampson, he kept the office for two nights; then 
he quit. Then Willester Manning was elected president, he 
kept it one night. We went four or five months without 
a president. We didn't have a man in Bogalusa who would 
stand up and take the job. I sent for A. Z. Young. He 
agreed to take the job."^ 
When A. Z. Young accepted the presidency of the 
League, Robert Hicks remained vice-president and Mrs. Jenkins 
the secretary. Young and Hicks were both employees at the 
Crown Zellerbach Corporation and leaders in their local 
Pulp, Sulphite and Papermill workers Union. Both having 
served as president of the union. At the time they took 
over the leadership of the League, Hicks was serving as 
president of the union, and Mrs. Jenkins was a $19.20 a 
week cook at the local Desporte Clinic. They formed a very 
close knit core of leaders, militant in their positions 
and straightforward about their decisions. Young's brother 
R. T. became treasurer and Charles Sims became financial 
secretary. (See Appendix C). 
With this ascendency of militant leadership in the 
League and the black community CORE was asked to remain 
in Bogalusa. The Klan forced the "recently integrated 
restaurants" to reverse their policies,and^increased their 
10 Ibid., June 18, 1976. 
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assault on CORE staffers and local blacks. This led to the 
establishment of a branch of the Deacons for Defense and 
Justice in February, 1965. The Deacons had been formed 
in Jonesboro, Louisiana in the summer of 1964. Charles 
Sims became its president. 
The significant factor about the Civil Rights 
Movement in Bogalusa was its leadership. The change in 
leadership in the Bogalusa Civic and Voters League that 
occurred between the Spring of 1964 and the Spring of 
1965 was an example of leadership developed inthe midst 
of a protracted struggle. The leadership of the League 
and the black community prior to 1965 was moderate and 
compromising, at best. Of the new leadership this was not 
the case. A. Z. Young and Hicks were laborers at 
Crown Zellerbach. At the time they were in their early 
forties and mid-thirties, respectively. They were shining 
examples of a young indigenous militant leadership. They 
were proven union organizers and leaders. 
Hicks, , who had served as the League's vice-president 
before the major desertion, remained as vice-president under 
Young's presidency. Prior to Young taking over the presi¬ 
dency of the League, Hicks and Mrs. Jenkins were the only 
militant forces in the League. Hicks in some respects was 
a stalwart in the Movement. He was the one black person 
-*--*-The Deacons will be discussed in detail later in 
this chapter. 
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to initially take white CORE members in his home; "I 
took whites into my home. No one else in the Bogalusa 
Voters League would do that; take a white person in their 
home. I don't know whether I was not aware of the racial 
problem or the thing in the white man or what he had. 
12 
But when I brought them into my home I was locked in." 
If a catalyst of the entire Movement is to be 
identified, then Mrs. Gayle Jenkins is indeed it. During 
the 1960's she exhibited an independence and assertiveness. 
She was responsible, for the most part, for the cohesive¬ 
ness of the leadership. Mrs. Jenkins represented the type 
of strength that was unprecedented in many respects. She 
states : 
I just wasn't afraid. Even Bob (speaking of Hicks); 
he said he would accept vice-president, but he 
would not take president. I think they were just 
afraid of the white structure here. Maybe I just 
didn't have sense enough to be afraid. I haven't 
been afraid and I never will be, I don't think . 
. .Everytime I would look at a white person and 
I'd get angry. 
A. Z. Young had all the requisites of effective leader¬ 
ship. With union organizing experience and a very articu¬ 
late and effective speaking ability, Young commanded the 
respect of the people of Bogalusa. He had always been 
recognized as aman who "went after what he wanted." Indeed 
like the others possessed a deep commitment and dedication 
12 Personal Interview, Robert Hicks, June 16, 1976. 
•^Personal Interview, Mrs Gayle Jenkins, June 18, 1976. 
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to black people. In some ways Young's confidence - some 
might say even arrogance - were key qualities of his leader¬ 
ship. His ascendency to the leadership of the Movement 
was characterized by his often quoted belief that Bogalusa 
would be the "proving ground of the South." He held to 
the idea that Bogalusa could be the first place in the 
South that would dramatize all that was good and just 
about integration. 
The Bogalusa Civic and Voters League became a 
different kind of organization. Prior to the change in 
leadership, the League was an instrument at the disposal 
of the mayor of Bogalusa. Its only objective was voter 
registration. However, when Young, Hicks and Mrs. Jenkins 
were chosen leaders of the League, its emphasis were far 
beyond voter registration. They engaged in "direct action" 
and led the battle against the Ku Klux Klan and the Crown 
Zellerbach Corporation. The formation of the Deacons 
for Defense and Justice established for the League a 
"military" arm that operated hand in hand with its political 
activities. 
Armed Defense: The Deacons for Defense and 
Justice 
The Deacons for Defense and Justice and its presi¬ 
dent, Charles Sims were significant forces in the entire 
Movement. Sims was generally regarded as a "dedicated man 
who would take a back seat to no man." To him the Deacons 
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were concerned with the welfare of the entire black community, 
and were formed, because "the general public, mainly 
blacks didn't have adequate police protection. We had to 
organize a group to protect our people. In organizing we 
had to make up our minds that we would be only on the 
defense of them."^ Sims further states that: 
The Deacons were not just a militant organization 
that believed in weapons, and what have you. We 
only used weapons, because we had to. We believed 
in helping to teach the community voter registration. 
We tried to get law enforcement to do their job. 
They wouldn't do their job, so we had to do the 
job for them. First, we didn't want anyone to know. 
This went on about a month. We then made up our 
minds that we didn't care who knew. It wasn't a 
secret what we were doing, we had a charter with 
the State of Louisiana. 
The Bogalusa Daily News was bitterly opposed to the 
Movement in general and Charles Sims and the Deacons in 
particular. Charles Sims it stated: 
is always in the bitter middle of the racial strife 
which has become a way of life in Bogalusa. The 
42 year old goateed Negro is president of the local 
chapter of the Deacons Committee for Defense and 
Justice. His arrest record at the Bogalusa police 
department has 21 entries dating back to 1957. He 
describes himself as an insurance agent but his 
main occupation these days is war leader of a mili¬ 
tant group of Negro men always willing to fight for 
their belief in the civil rights movement.I® 
^^Personal Interview, Charles Sims, June 21, 1976. 
15Ibid., June 21, 1976. 
^Bogalusa Daily News, July 12, 1965. 
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Sims had long since been recognized and respected for his 
militant nature. The white community knew and understood 
Sims effectiveness in the black community. His experience 
as a "tech-sergeant" in the Army made him equally qualified 
to head the Deacons in Bogalusa. Therefore, the whites 
in Bogalusa and throughout Louisiana attempted to remove 
Sims from the scene. The New York Times reported that the 
Citizens Council of Louisiana announced a segregationist 
drive against common law marriage among Negroes. It was 
aimed specifically at the Civil Rights Movement in Bogalusa. 
A warrant was issued agains Sims, because the police said 
he had a common law wife. The report went further to 
state that thousands of Negro men and women would be put 
1 7 in prison for living together illegally. 
Indeed the Deacons were an effective arm of the Civil 
Rights Movement in Bogalusa. Not only did it defend the 
black community against terrorism, but it also guarded 
against Uncle Tomism within the black community. Much of 
the success of the Deacons had been due to Sims. By the 
summer of 1965 he had become a nationally recognized figure. 
T O 
Twice during the summer he appeared on the Louis Lomax-1- show 
in Los Angeles,California. His appearances attracted a 
■^See The New York Times, July 13, 1965. 
18 
Lomax is the author of The Negro Revolt, (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1962). 
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lot of attention on the West Coast. Many people requested 
that Sims help organize a Deacons in Los Angeles. According 
to Sims from these meetings came the Black Panther Party. 
He impressed upon them that, "they didn't have to organize 
the Deacons in Los Angeles. They can organize any type 
of organization that believed in the same philosophy that 
19 
the Deacons believed in." Huey Newton and Bobby Seale 
did use the Deacons as a historical reference to organize 
20 
the Black Panther Party. 
Although, the Deacons were more publicized in Boga- 
lusa and Jonesboro, they did exist elsewhere in Louisiana. 
The Deacons were very active in Homer and Tallulah, also. 
There were also chapters in Mississippi and Alabama. There 
were an estimated 5,000 to 15,000 members throughout the 
21 South. According to Sims, who presently refers to him¬ 
self as the National Chairman of the Deacons there were 
some fifty-six chapters in the South and North. 
The Proving Ground of the South 
By April 1965, the League had shown a political 
maturity that had never existed among black people in 
Bogalusa. On April 6, 1965 it presented Mayor Jesse H. 
Cutrer with a list of demands; which made clear the position 
of the black community on their condition in Bogalusa: 
19 
Personal Interview, Charles Sims, June 21, 1976. 
^See Bobby Seale, Seize the Time, (New York: Random 
House, 1968), p. 117. 
21 
Personal Interview, Charles Sims, June 21, 1976. 
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the white leaders of Bogalusa and Washington Parish 
have on occasion expressed the view that "race 
relations," as they call it, have been happy and 
harmonious over the years. They seem publicly 
amazed and dismayed when assertions by Negroes make 
clear that whites only are susceptible to that 
myth. 
Negroes are not interested in "race relations." We 
speak of freedom, justice, and equality. We are 
citizens, not "race relations;" and we assert our 
citizenship. 
We regard the following as minimal and reasonable 
requirements to our citizenship and ask you to help 
us attain them: 
1 - Equal economic opportunity in public and private 
employment and in city licensing practices. 
2 - Equal educational opportunities in integrated 
school facilities. 
3 - Desegregation of all public accomodations and 
facilities. 
4 - Extension to all the community of sewer, paved 
roads, bright street lighting, and adequate 
enforced housing codes. 
5 - Inclusion of Negro leaders on a decision-making 
level on city and parish general and industrial 
planning boards. 
6 - Removal from city ordinances of all unconstitu¬ 
tional discriminatory laws. 
7 - Employment of Negro city policemen with all 
proper police power9to help insure the equal 
enforcement of law. z 
Outrer's 'only reply to the demands was that he would 
be-^glad to meet with one or more of the 'local citizens and 
members of the Bogalusa Civic and Voters 'League. 
22 
See the Bogalusa Daily News, April 9, 1965. 
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On April 9th James Farmer, National Director of 
CORE and Ronnie Moore, the organization's state field 
director led a march of about five hundred people to 
City Hall. Mayor Cutrer, initially pledging to help solve 
the racial problems, insisted that half of the black 
negotiating team be drawn from those who opposed CORE'S 
O O 
presence in Bogalusa. 
Cutrer was determined in his insistence against the new 
militant leadership of the black community. He commissioned 
a subcommittee of the Bogalusa Community Affairs Committee 
to conduct a survey to determine the Negro leadership of 
the city.^ Cutrer said that the Bogalusa Civic and Voters 
League that was working with CORE, at that time, was not 
representative of the Negro community. The survey was to 
determine the true leadership. It was to be conducted in 
the black community; asking blacks to name the persons 
o 5 
they felt were the leaders of the black population. 
However, the black community did not participate in the 
^See August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, CORE : A Study 
In the Civil Rights Movement, 1942-1968, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), p. 348. Alsoaccording to Robert 
Hicks the mayor wanted blacks who resigned from the BCVL to 
be a part of the negotiating team. 
24 
The survey was conducted from various business estab¬ 
lishments when blacks went into these various places, i.e., 
banks, stores, they were asked to fill out questionnaires. 
"*See Bogalusa Daily News, April 21, 1965. 
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survey. Young and the other leaders had won the complete 
confidence and respect of the mass of the black community. 
The level of the struggle had now moved toward intense 
programs of picket lines on the downtown merchants. This 
escalation also prompted the then Governor John McKeithen 
to send in over three hundred State Police. 
During this struggle the Crown Zellerbach Corporation 
had refrained from taking a position on the Bogalusa situa¬ 
tion. Instead, it had remained neutral. In effect, such 
neutrality was supportive of the white community. Wilfred 
Ussery, CORE'S National Vice-Chairman formed a "Bogalusa 
Committee for Concern" in San Francisco, to pressure Crown 
Zellerbach's top national executives to take an active 
position in resolving the Bogalusa crisis. This committee 
had been established on February 12, 1965. It had asked 
Crown Zellerbach to meet with the representatives of the 
Voters League, to discuss the company's policies in 
Bogalusa and to hire black women in the Bogalusa plants as 
a show of good faith. The committee's larger concerns 
called for the Crown Zellerbach Corporation to prepare 
both nationally and at its Bogalusa plant a general policy 
statement reiterating its support of equal rights and pro- 
^See CORE Southern Newsletter, Berkeley Campus 
CORE, July 14" 1965. See also August Meier and Elliot Rud- 
wick, CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942- 
1968, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 348. 
See also Rony "Bogalusa: The Economics of Tragedy," p. 243. 
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tection for all citizens under the Constitution and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (for a complete text of one set 
of demands, see Appendix D). The committee also was re¬ 
sponsible for raising funds for the Bogalusa Movement. 
The Crown Zellerbach Corporation did issue a policy 
statement on the Bogalusa situation. The Chairman of its 
Board of Directors, Reed 0. Hunt, issued a statement on 
April 22, 1965 at the company's Annual Share Owners meeting 
in San Francisco. The statement was titled "Equal Employ- 
27 ment Opportunity in Bogalusa, Louisiana." Hunt's first 
suggestion in the statement was that Bogalusa was "not a 
company town." He stated, that "today you might describe 
Bogalusa as a mill town, perhaps, but it is not a 
company town. We have worked hard to bring about this change." 
Hunt further stated that the impetus for any type of non- 
discriminatory policy was not of Crown's initiative. He 
stated, "as contract suppliers of paper to the Federal 
government, we were subject to Executive Order 10925. This 
order by the president required companies doing business 
under contract with the Federal government to develop pro¬ 
grams for providing equal employment opportunity to their 
people. It did not require overnight compliance." Finally, 
Hunt's statement on the company's basic position revealed 
the true character of a company bent on exploiting a situation 
27 Reed 0. Hunt, Equal Employment Opportunity in 
Bogalusa, Louisiana," (San Francisco: April 22, 1965). 
-79- 
for its own advancement: 
we will not dictate to this community, or any com¬ 
munity in which we operate. The Civil Rights issue 
is a community responsibility. The company has its 
part to play. We have our special responsibilities. 
Dictation is not one of them. 
First and foremost is our responsibility for equal 
employment opportunity. This is a national policy. 
This is a company policy. It is a fair policy. We 
must live up to it. 
But we recognize that we have wider responsibilities 
and obligations in Bogalusa. These take the form 
of support for community institutions, support of 
law and order, living up to the requirements of 
good corporate citizenship. 
In the final conclusion, then, Crown Zellerbach took a 
position in favor of the established regulations in 
Bogalusa. 
The months of May and June of 1965 were marked by 
increased protest and demonstrations. Three areas of 
protest were developed. First, picket lines were set up 
downtown, to end discriminatory hiring and differential wage 
policies. The city tried to deny blacks freedom of assembly 
by passing a series of ordinances, making it illegal for 
more than two people to walk a picket line. The second 
area of protest grew out of the unconstitutional ordi¬ 
nances which were issued in June, 1965. This took the 
form of demands for the abolition of the ordinances and 
democratic control over the police. The city park was the 
third area of protest. The attempt to integrate the park, 
28 Ibid., p. 8. 
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however, was met with violence. White mobs and policemen 
beat blacks who entered the park. All of this happened 
despite the mayor's promise that the park and other public 
facilities would be opened to blacks. 
While Bogalusa was the only town in Washington Parish 
actively engaged in the struggle for desegregation and 
equal rights, blacks in the entire Parish had benefited 
from the struggles in Bogalusa. Two black men had been 
selected as the first black deputy sheriffs in Washington 
Parish. Both were from Vanado, Louisiana; a small community 
town about seven miles north of Bogalusa. The two men 
were O'Neal Moore and Creed Rodgers, both in their thirties. 
The deputies patrolled throughout the black communities of 
the Parish. For the black community, they represented 
symbols of security and hope. Their presence helped to 
keep down the night riding, which had increased with the 
escalation of demonstrations. 
However, on June 2, 1965, a fatal blow was to shadow 
that security and hope. On the night of June 2, 1965, 
while on patrol Moore and Rodgers were ambushed. Moore 
was instantly killed and Rodgers was critically wounded. 
Earnest R. McElveen, a 41 year old white employer at Crown 
Zellerbach was arrested in Tylertown, Mississippi shortly 
after the ambush. Moore and Rodgers had been hired the 
year before as a campaign promise to black political leaders 
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of the Parish, by Sheriff Dorman Crowe. McElveen was a 
member of the United Conservatives, a right wing segre¬ 
gationist organization. The United Conservatives were 
a spinoff from the Klan in face of investigations by 
the House Committee on Un-American Activities. When 
arrested, four membership cards were found in McElveen's 
pockets. The cards identified him as a member of the 
29 Citizens Council, the national States Rights party, the 
National Rifleman's Association, and as a special agent of 
30 the State Police; an honorary position he held since 1962. 
29 The State Rights party was a right-wing, anti-semitic 
racist organization, headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama. 
on J McElveen was subsequently defended by Baton Rouge 
criminal lawyer, Ossie B. Brown. Brown maintained his client 
innocent. McElveen was acquitted of the charges. This is the 
same Ossie Brown who successfully defended one black Sergeant 
Mitchell of the Mai Lai charges. And the same Brown, who as 
District Attorney of East Baton Rouge Parish failed to find 
anyone guilty of the murders of two Southern University stu¬ 
dents in November 1972. 
The year 1966 was also to witness two shootings of black per¬ 
sons. The first was on March 11th. A black Army Captain, 
while using a public telephone at a gasoline station, was shot 
in the back. Donald Sims was home preparing for his first tour 
of duty in Vietnam. The man who shot him was Thomas Bennett, 
a 43 year old employee with the Crown Zellerbach Corporation. 
He was charged and later acquitted of attempted murder. A 
lynch-type murder was committed against another black man 
on July 31, 1966. Clarence Triggs, 24 years old,,was found 
dead near the Pearl River. He was murdered by two white men, 
Homer Richard Seale and John W. Copling, Jr. They too were 
acquitted of murder. The Crown Zellerbach Corporation did not 
even issue a statement expressing concern over the fact that 
two of its employees were responsible for two of the shootings. 
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A law suit in the sum of $425,000 was filed by 
eleven black persons and one white CORE worker in the 
Federal District Court. The suit charged the defendents 
with conspiring to deprive blacks of their equal pro¬ 
tection under the law, due process and general police 
brutality and harassment. The suit was filed against the 
mayor, the public safety commissioner, the police chief, 
the State Police superintendent, the Washington Parish 
sheriff, two city policemen and a Parish deputy. After 
hearing the case the Court enjoined the police department 
of Bogalusa and Washington Parish from using violence and 
threats to prevent blacks from exercising their civil 
rights. Federal District Judge, Herbert W. Christenberry 
ordered Arnold Spier, Bogalusa Commissioner of Public 
Safety and Claxton Knight, Bogalusa Chief of Police to take 
all means to protect the Civil Rights demonstrators. The 
Court also ordered Spiers and Knight to file with it written 
reports on the first of each month for one.- year, showing that 
they complied with its orders. 31- 
Violence continued against blacks throughout the 
summer of 1965. The Voters League decided to conduct a seven 
day series of marches to dramatize their struggle to the 
nation. The marches began on July 7th. Each march was to 
have its own leader of some national statue. The likes of 
31 See New Orleans Times .July 31, 1965. 
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Dick Gregory, James Farmer, Martin Luther King, Jr., 
and two of his aides, Elton Cox and James Bevels were 
to lead a march at some point during the seven days. 
However, the marches did not occur as planned. 
32 
At the request of the mayor, the governor sent in more 
State Troopers and violence continued. At the end of the 
second march a white man was shot by a black man, alleged 
to be a Deacon. The shooting occured when Henry Austin went 
to the aid of one of the Civil Rights nurses, who was thrown 
to the ground by a white man, while she aided a wounded 
girl. Governor McKeithen, after failing a few weeks earlier 
to get a cooling off period in Bogalusa sent his personal 
plane to fly Young and Hicks to his mansion, to persuade 
them to accept another proposal for a cooling off period. 
Young and Hicks agreed to take the proposal back to the 
rank and file, but the rank and file would not accept the 
proposal and pledged to continue the struggle. Having 
failed, McKeithen instituted a biracial commission to deal 
with the Bogalusa situation. However, the commission 
could do very little. 
By the summer of 1965, picketing and sit-ins were 
the order of the day. The Justice Department agreed to 
send John Doar to Bogalusa. Doar was head of the Civil 
Rights Division and President Johnson's personal emissary. 
■^See Southern Newsletter, Berkeley Campus CORE, 
July 14, 1965. 
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However, Doar and the FBI agents, who were also sent 
in were themselves targets of harassment from the white 
segregationists. Doar's office in the local United States 
Postal Building was under constant picketing by whites. 
The Bogalusa Movement did have some minimal vic¬ 
tories to show for its activity. Two black men qualified 
for and passed the Civil Service test to become the first 
black policemen in Bogalusa. The downtown restaurants 
and theaters were desegregated. A school desegregation 
suit was filed by CORE1s attorneys asking for preliminary 
and permanent injunctions to prevent the Bogalusa School 
Board from operating a bi-racial school system and from 
making student and teacher assignment; from the disbursing 
of funds; and from constructing buildings and scheduling 
extracurricular activities on a racial basis. The Court 
thereby ordered limited educational integration. 
Although, the first six months of the Movement cost 
the city an additional ninety-six thousand dollars in 
33 police expenses, it was the merchants on Columbia Road, 
the main street of the town, that suffered the greatest 
losses. The League had used the economic boycott effectively. 
Individual stores lost anywhere from fifteen to eighty-five 
percent of anticipated business during the first eight months 
of the Movement. Even though, the merchants suggested that 
they could do something to resolve the racial conflict, they 
were afraid of the white segregationists. And if they would 
^See Bogalusa Daily News, July 12, 1965. 
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have offered any solutions to problems, they felt the 
Klan would have bombed their stores. 
The only concession that the first eight months of 
the Movement received from Crown Zellerbach was its acceptance 
"in principle" of a proposal urged by the Federal Equal 
Opportunities Commission, to abolish its segregated line 
of progression in two of its departments. However, Crown 
Zellerbach's role in this entire matter was more broader 
than the aforementioned. Extensive discussion on the role 
of Crown will be taken up later in the next chapter. 
The summer of 1965 also brought a new consolidation 
of the Movement within the black community. Efforts were 
made to raise the political consciousness of the black 
people in Bogalusa, about the national predicament of blacks, 
both historically and contemporaneously. The League, with 
the cooperation of CORE workers set up Freedom schools in 
various sections of the community. The schools were used 
to teach black history and provide voter education, and the 
like. This gave the impetus to a voter registration drive 
that was able to register eighty percent of the qualified 
blacks during that summer. 
The Struggle Against "Inferior" Education 
In the Fall of 1965, a new stage of struggle had 
developed, and a new dimension to the Bogalusa Civic and 
Voters League was consolidated. The schools in the black 
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community, had long since suffered from inadequate equip¬ 
ment and facilities. Black principals had hitherto done 
little, if anything, to request or demand better and adequate 
facilities to provide quality education to black youth. 
In 1965 there were three black elementary schools, from 
grades first through seventh; one black elementary school, 
from grades first through eight; and one black high school, 
from grades ninth through twelfth. The books and other 
materials usually were used and left over from the white 
schools, and there was always the problem of not enough 
to go around. One such example of the inequity of the 
distribution between the white and black schools was in 
the area of expenditures; for example, for the Bogalusa 
School Board spent $1,094,737.88 on the white schools and 
A yj 
$488,186.18 on the black schools. There was also an 
obvious disregard for black teachers acquiring new teaching 
methods and techniques. For 1965, $456.64 was spent on 
conferences and workshops for white teachers ; while no 
money was provided for black teachers for the same purpose. 
Black parents and students took the initiative to 
bring the matters to the attention of the black principals. 
However, the principals were negligent in their responsi¬ 
bility and refused to bring these matters to the attention 
of the School Board. The result was a full scale boycott 
of the black schools. This launched a new phase in the 
From memorandum of Bogalusa Civic and Voters League, 
"Research on Bogalusa Schools, 1965. 
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Bogalusa struggle, and sharpened the contradictions 
between the mass of the black community and its profes¬ 
sionals . 
The school situation also saw the development of a 
youth arm of the Bogalusa Civic and Voters League. The 
Youth League was headed by Don Expose, the son of Mrs. 
Jenkins. Don was, perhaps, one of the most popular students 
around. The boycott of the schools began in October, 1965. 
A list of demands was presented to the School Board, from 
the Youth League (See Appendix E). A full week of boycotts 
was initiated at each black school. The students also 
participated in a picket at the school's gates, along with 
several marches to the School Board office; highlighted 
by the arrest of some 250 students at one time. Along 
with refusing to listen to the demands, the School Board 
also threatened the black parents with fines of $10 per 
day or 10 days in jail or both. Overall bail for the 
arrested students reached the amount of twenty thousand 
dollars. And if that was not enough to force the end of 
the boycott and marches, some officials of the League were 
arrested and charged with contributing to the delinquency 
of minors. 
Violence was also inflicted upon the students, by 
the police. The demonstrations by the students and the 
larger black community led to the increase in police 
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brutality. After a rally that was held at the local 
black union hall, many black persons were openly attacked 
in the heart of one section of the black community. Police 
literally went down the street from door to door beating 
and kicking blacks. This occured on the main "night strip" 
in the black community. When it was over the night was 
properly characterized as a "night of terror." The black 
community was caught completely off guard and many blacks 
were literally dragged from night clubs, while being beaten 
on the head. In spite of the problems in the Bogalusa 
School System and the brutality inflicted upon black 
students and the black community, the Crown Zellerbach 
Corporation remained neutral and steadfast in its pledge 
to live up to "the requirements of good corporate citizen¬ 
ship," by not interfering in what it called the affairs of 
the community. 
The remainder of the year of 1965 was characteri¬ 
zed by a relative calm in the school demonstrations. By 
August 1966 Federal District Judge Frederick J. R. Heebee 
ordered the "freedom of choice" system of desegregating the 
Bogalusa School System. He also ordered all teachers hired 
without regard to race or color. In the Fall of 1967, the 
School Board began to make some improvements at the black 
schools. The Board, for instance, put new recreational 
equipment at most of the black schools. Finally, in the 
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Summer of 1969, the Federal court ordered the total de¬ 
segregation of the Bogalusa School System. This court 
order was to be the decisive turn in ithe relationship 
between blacks and whites in Bogalusa. 
School Desegregation and Student Activism 
When the Federal government ordered the total de¬ 
segregation of the public school system in the South in 
1969, the racial polarization of the black and white com¬ 
munities in Bogalusa became more intense. For the black 
students, particularly those at the high school level at 
the time, this meant that they would not finish out their 
high school years having experienced the type of cultural 
affinity that had meant so much to others who had 
attended Central Memorial High (the black high school). 
On the other hand, these students had grown up experiencing 
the bitterness of racial contradictions and an education 
that lacked the type of quality enjoyed by whites. 
The suit which prompted the total desegregation of 
the Bogalusa school system was brought by Willie Elliot 
Jenkins, another of Mrs. Jenkins' sons.^ After several 
plans were submitted to the Federal District Court in 
the summer of 1969, the Court accepted the plan of the 
School Board. This plan resulted in the demotion of all 
of the black principals and all of the black teachers except 
35 
See Jenkins vs. City of Bogalusa School Board, E.D. 
La. , Civ. No. 15798, Sec. ËFT, 1969. 
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one. There were no black head coaches over any of the 
athletic programs. The two high schools were merged into 
one; with two campuses: Bogalusa High School West at 
the former Bogalusa High School, for grades eleven and 
twelve and Bogalusa High School East at the former 
Central Memorial High School,for grades nine and ten. The 
three black elementary schools were closed down, with the 
elementary students being distributed throughout the 
eight all-white elementary schools and the one junior 
high school, located in the white community. 
All the trends that have been common to newly 
desegregated school situations were present in Bogalusa. 
Central Memorial High School, for example was given a 
complete rejuvenation for the advent of white students, 
in the Fall of 1969. Like the students of the 1965 
Youth League, the black students of 1969 were determined 
to remove all the constraints that would keep them in a 
segregated position in the midst of Court ordered segrega¬ 
tion. The high point of the struggles of 1969 was over the 
high school homecoming activities. A black student had come 
in second in the balloting for the Homecoming Queen, but 
the white school officials did not want her as first maid. 
They therefore, usurped the process of selection and 
chose an all white Homecoming Court. This prompted black 
students to organize under the banner of "Students for 
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Ultimate Liberation" (S.O.U.L.). Throughout the 
month of October 1969, boycotts of class and sit-ins in the 
principals's office were utilized to dramatize the discon¬ 
tent of the black students. Their efforts were totally 
supported by the black community. 
The Bogalusa Civic and Voters League immediately 
joined the students in their efforts. Mr. Young was in¬ 
cluded as one of the defendents in the School Board's in- 
O CL 
junction to stop the demonstrations of the black students. 
Although the black community and the students lost all of 
the Court battles against the School Board, their activities 
made clear the injustice under the desegregated situation. 
Black students made every effort to make the Court's 
decision work. However, they were prevented from partici¬ 
pation in all school activities except sports and music, 
of which they were dominant in terms of talent. Fights 
and the like continued throughout the year. In May 1970 
of that school year, remnants of the 1965 police brutality 
was prevalent. Police attacked black junior high and high 
school students with tear gas and dogs. This mobilized 
Two injunctions were brought against black students 
in October, 1969. See City of Bogalusa School Board vs A.Z. 
Young, Rickey Hill, et. al, and City of Bogalusa School Board 
vs. Rickey Hill, et. al. Both injunctions were filed in the 
Federal District Court, Eastern District, Louisiana. 
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the black community to rally. However, the conflict 
was brought to the Federal Court and settled. There were 
some isolated situations of violence against white mer¬ 
chants and whites who drove through the black community. 
In all, the black community made every effort to comply 
with the Court's desegregation order. And even in the 
midst of racial conflict the situation was brought to the 
Federal Judge. The years, 1970 through 1971 saw more of 
the same racial conflicts within the school system. More 
and more the black community, and particularly the Voters 
League began to view desegregation with more caution, 
basically questioning its utility as the way to achieve 
quality education. 
CHAPTER V 
THE POLITICS OF PROGRESS OR ACCOMODATION? 
In Pursuit of the Electoral Arena 
By 1967 attention was given to the electoral arena. 
After the League failed to convince Governor McKeithen 
to fill a Bogalusa School Board vacancy in March 1966, 
with Robert Hicks, Hicks ran for the Board in 1967. 
Since all the officers of the Board are at-large seats, 
the League did not delude itself about winning. Instead, 
Hicks' presence in the race for the School Board meant 
that the black community was prepared to struggle on all 
fronts. Hicks won the two black precincts. A. Z. Young 
ran for Police Juror, at the same time, he too met the 
same fate as Hicks. 
In 1970 and 1971 the black community made another 
big effort to break through the segregated electoral 
arena. A. Z. Young ran for mayor in 1970. Young's presence 
in the runoff would prove that things were changing in 
Bogalusa. However, his biggest opposition did not come 
directly from whites, but his black opponent. Young's 
campaign was run on the theme that, like the black 
community, many in the white community were from the "grass 
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roots," and therefore his campaign was a "grass roots" 
campaign. He did campaign in various sections of the 
white community. The other black in the mayoral race 
was one of the local morticians, one Earl R. Arnold, Jr. 
It was generally felt, throughout the black community, 
that Arnold was paid to run for mayor, in order to block 
Young's chances at the runoff. 
Young overwhelmed Arnoldirr.both of the predominantly 
black precincts. Although, in the white precincts, 
where they both received votes, Arnold received more than 
Young. Tabulation later revealed that Young's chances at 
the runoff would have been boosted if Arnold was not in 
the race.'*’ The runoff was between a local white embalmer, 
Louis Rawls and a car dealer, C.P. Verger. Rawls won the 
election, David Johnson, Sr., who was the first General 
Vice President of Local 189, the International United 
Papermakers and Paperworkers, ran for Commissioner of 
Streets and Parks. He too won overwhelmingly in the two 
black precincts, but did not get enough votes from the other 
precincts to make the runoff. 
In 1971 three blacks also ran for the Bogalusa 
School Board. They were Andrew Moses, McClurie Sampson 
I 
Young received 741 votes to Arnold's 421. If Young 
would have received the votes of Arnold he could have possi¬ 
bly made the runoff. 
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and the Reverend Dr. Clifton Williams (Williams was a 
former high school Chemistry and Physics teacher at 
Central Memorial High and was now the first black chemist 
at Crown Zellerbach). Moses polled most of the votes, but 
they all lost. The fact that any one black candidate polled 
the most votes in a given election did not mean that he 
was who the black community favored. At no time during 
any of the elections did the black community give a man¬ 
date to any one black person. Although, the League con¬ 
trolled the larger black community, there still remained 
contradictions between the current leaders of the League 
and old line persons such as Moses. In this regard, 
there had also been continued conflicts between the League 
and the local NAACP chapter during the Civil Rights years, 
but the school crisis brought them closer together on 
the problems of blacks in Bogalusa. 
From 1970 to 1975 the League increasingly became 
less of an activist organization and more of a party organ; 
endorsing political candidates. They concluded that the 
at-large system of elections would never allow a black to 
be elected. Therefore, much of their time was spent trying 
to establish relationships with those whites who would 
listen to the needs of blacks. Because blacks, having 
been enfranchised by the Civil Rights Movement had now 
become the deciding factor in the City and Parish elections. 
Changes also took place in the League's leadership. 
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A1though, the presidency, vice-presidency and secretary 
remained in the hands of Young, Hicks,and Jenkins, 
their socio-economic status began to change. Hicks had 
taken the supervisory position at Crown. And Mrs. Jenkins 
was pursuing nursing training. The biggest change 
came with Young which was not only socio-economic, but 
also political. In 1972 Young was offered the position 
of Special Assistant to the State Hospital Director, 
by the newly elected governor, Edwin Edwards. Young had 
worked hard for Edward's campaign not only in Bogalusa 
and Washington Parish, but across the State. His acceptance 
of the job left somewhat of a vacuum in the leadership of 
the black community. However, the League remained 
together and began to work on such matters as the re¬ 
apportionment of the districts in the city. 
In 1974, the Washington Parish branch of the NAACP, 
headed by one William Bailey, Jr.^ filed suit against the 
Bogalusa Commission Council, asking for a federal injunction 
against the total at-large system of elections, that 
O 
prevented blacks from being elected to the Council. The 
Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana had prepared 
o 
William Bailey, Jr. was the first black to register 
to vote in Washington Parish in July, 1950. See Bogalusa 
Daily News, July 28, 1950. Bailey, who lives in Bogalusa has 
served as NAACP president for 22 years. 
See the Bogalusa Daily News, August 16, 1974. 
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a study on governmental reorganization in 1972, recommending 
reapportionment, but it was rejected by the mayor and the 
Commission Council.^ A Charter Commission was created 
in March 1973 to develop a home rule charter and provide 
for a reapportionment plan. The commission has yet to 
complete its study. William Bailey, Jr. is the only black 
member on the commission. 
A similar suit, like the NAACP's was filed in 
1975 against the City of Bogalusa's School Board. The 
suit was filed by "Concerned Citizens for Good Government," 
an unincorporated civic association with a membership 
made up predominantely of persons of the black race. Their 
suit called for an apportioning of the School Board on 
a one man, one vote basis. The case, however, is still 
pending.^ Three blacks ran for the School Board in 1975, 
Andrew Moses tried again, along with one, James Cyrus and 
Murkel Sibley. Cyrus and Sibley are supervisors at Crown 
Zellerbach. Of the three, Sibley polled more black votes; 
t: 
with Moses getting more in the overall tabulation. 
However, they all lost. The suit therefore, was prompted 
by the results of this election. 
^See the Public Affiars Research Council of Louisiana, 
Incorporated, Bogalusa City Government, Analysis and Recommen¬ 
dation For a More Effective Operation, (Baton Rouge: 
December 1972). 
^See Concerned Citizens for Good Government vs. City 
of Bogalusa School Board, et al., Civ., March 1975. 
^Moses received 3,033 votes, Cyrus received 2,127 votes, 
and Sibley received 1,947 votes. 
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From the Parish Seat to the State Capitol 
The high point of 1967 was the marches from 
Bogalusa to the parish seat in Franklinton, Louisiana and 
to the State Capitol in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The intent 
of the marches was to dramatize for the demands that the 
Bogalusa Civic and Voters League made on parish and state 
officials, during 1965 (See Appendix F). The march to 
Franklinton was joined by CORE'S Associate Director, 
Lincoln Lynch. Lynch attempted to analyze the development 
of the Civil Rights Movement, when he spoke to the rally 
on the steps of the parish seat. He stated to people in front 
of the Washington Parish Courthouse that there was a new 
movement and that it was no longer the Civil Rights Movement 
anymore, but a Movement of revolution. Lynch obviously 
expressed CORE'S new position at that time on "Black Power." 
Lynch went further to explain what he meant: 
some call it black power, others call it black 
revolution, but its all the same. If those rednecks 
in Bogalusa won't hire you don't picket their store 
anymore, run them out of your neighborhood. The days 
of black people clapping their hand and singing are 
over and many of you are going to be asked to kill 
for your freedom and you better be ready, to kill.' 
A. Z. Young made it clear to the people that from Franklin¬ 
ton they would move to the governor's office and if McKeithen 
would not listen he was going to President Johnson. 
Less than a month later, in August 1967, marchers 
set out form Bogalusa to Baton Rouge. The trek is roughly 
^See The Times-Picayune, July 25,1967. 
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102 miles. And while the road was long it was to be 
difficult also, for southeastern Louisiana was the heart 
of Klan country. The march travelled through four parishes; 
St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Livingston and East Baton Rouge. 
A. Z.Young, who directed the march to Baton Rouge Slimmed 
up its purpose: 
I felt that the State was also involved in some of 
the discriminatory policies imposed on black people 
in this State. I also felt that the State should 
afford Blacks an equal opportunity, in terms of em¬ 
ployment. And also should play a role in trying to 
bring about a better relationship between blacks and 
whites. And to dispose of the discriminatory policies, 
not only in Bogalusa but throughout the state of 
Louisiana.8 
The marchers from Bogalusa were joined by other blacks as 
they moved through the various parishes. The biggest con¬ 
frontation was in Satsuma, Louisiana; a "one shot" town 
on U. S. 190, five miles west of Livingston, Louisiana. 
Here whites lined both sides of the highway to attack the 
marchers as they passed. On August 16th, seventy-five 
whites "broke" through the police lines and attacked twenty 
blacks. The result was injuries to both whites and blacks. 
One, Mr. Charlie Weary, perhaps the oldest of the marchers, 
suffered a broken jaw bone in the confrontation. 
When the marchers reached Baton Rouge, blacks from 
all over the State joined in the rally and demonstrations 
at the State Capitol. The likes of Zelma Wyche of Tallulah, 
Q 
Louisiana and H. Rap Brown participated in the demonstration. 
g 
Personal interview, A. Z. Young, June 17, 1976. 
^Zelma Wyche is the black Chief of Police in Tallulah. 
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However, there were no other activities outside the Capitol 
building. The marchers had dramatized their demands to 
the governor, and had shown for the first time that black 
people in the State of Louisiana were not afraid to stand 
up to State authorities. 
The efforts to remove the racial constraints in 
the City of Bogalusa continued from 1967 throughout in 
the form of marches and meetings with city officials. The 
decisive struggle had found victory more in the fact that 
a new dignity among black people had developed. Some of 
the grievances had been resolved: two black men had been 
put on the police force; relative improvements had been 
made in the facilities in the black community; the feeling 
of knowing that blacks could patronize the white restaurants 
and the downstairs of the theaters was in progress, whether 
blacks went or not; and the Voters League became the recog¬ 
nized voice of the black community. 
The MBig Company" and Racism: The Struggle Against 
the Crown Zellerbach Corporation and Dual Unionism 
The struggle at the Crown Zellerbach Corporation had 
not ceased. It was a two pronged struggle; first against 
the discriminatory policies and practices of the company, 
and second against the dual unionism. The situation at 
Crown Zellerbach was characterized by dual lines of pro¬ 
gression; one for blacks and one for whites, segregated 
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eating and shower facilities and the relegation of blacks 
to yard and common labor jobs. The labor unions were 
also segregated. The United Papermakers and Paperworkers 
had local 189 for white and local 189A for blacks. The 
International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Papermill 
Workers had local 362 for whites and local 624 for blacks. 
The union locals negotiated their contracts separately. 
In 1964, the black local 189A appealed to the 
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity to 
pressure Crown Zellerbach to open up all jobs to all persons. 
This resulted in the "merger of the extra-boards." The 
extra boards were used to fill temporary and permanent 
vacancies in the various line of progression. The members 
of the black extra-board were only eligible for vacancies 
on the black line of progression. The merger would supposedly 
make each employee on the extra-board eligible for temporary 
and permanent employment throughout the mill. 
In July 1965, when Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 became effective, the Equal Employment Opportu¬ 
nity Commission became involved in the Bogalusa case. 
The prime issues at the time were the merger of the lines 
of progression; the desegregation of the cafeteria, sanitary 
and eating facilities and locker rooms; which were required 
under Title VII. Title VII went into effect in regard to 
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Crown Zellerbach on July 2, 1965, Section 703 (a) (2) 
made it unconstitutional for a employer : 
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in 
any way which would deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. 
Crown Zellerbach proposed for incumbent employees a "hori¬ 
zontal intermeshing of the present white and Negro pro¬ 
gression lines into one line of progression. This would 
have retained existing white and black designations. 
Although, the promotion of blacks would have occured, the 
top five jobs would have been prohibited to blacks until 
all whites had advanced. The chairman of Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission; Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., 
entered the situation and produced an agreement between the 
company and the unions which provided for a merger of the 
lines, by intermeshing eleven of them and opening up every 
job classification and all employees without discrimination. 
Although, the black local, initially accepted the agreement 
and later opposed it; the consent of the white local made 
the agreement binding, since it outnumbered the black local 
1250 to 250. The black local opposed the agreement because 
they were still required to start at the bottom. 
10 See Northrup, The Negro in the Paper Industry, (Phila¬ 
delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969). 
11 
Ibid., p. 98. 
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By 1966, Crown Zellerbach continued to award job 
promotions according to seniority; the man with the most 
years in the job slot below the vacancy had first call; 
the number of years worked in the mill meant nothing. 
Blacks, therefore, had only seniority in bidding for jobs 
against each other and newer white employees. The deter¬ 
mining factor was the years spent in the former white line 
of progression. In mid 1966 the successor agency to the 
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, 
the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) charged 
Crown Zellerbach with restrictions on black employment and 
promotions. It also maintained that Crown Zellerbach's 
facilities were still de facto segregated. This forced 
Crown to make a number of concessions. It abolished its 
testing programs, actively recruited blacks and promoted 
some. This met with disapproval from local 189, which in 
negotiating its 1967 contract did not settle on the seniority 
question. This then prompted the OFCC to disagree with 
the agreement between Crown and its white union, and it 
forced it to circulate a "consulting memorandum to all 
Federal agencies, requiring contracting officers to consult 
with it before granting contracts to Crown Zellerbach. A 
l2Ibid., p. 99. 
13 Ibid., p. 100. See also Crown Zellerbach Corporation 
vs Wirtz, p. 281, F.Supp. 377, (Dist. Court, D. CTj 1968). 
See also Monday vs. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, p. 271, 
F. Supp. 258 (Dis. Ct., La., 1967). 
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previous memorandum, that was withdrawn, caused 
Crown loss of business."^ 
Crown Zellerbach's lack of aggressiveness on 
the matters of upgrading blacks resulted in two law 
suits being filed against it and local 189 on behalf of 
black employees by the Federal government in 1968. 
The court decisions approved a stipulation providing 
for the merger of the union locals in which blacks 
would be guaranteed a vice-presidency and other repre¬ 
sentation. Other than the intervention of the federal 
government, on behalf of black employees of Crown 
Zellerbach and court decisions in favor of black employees, 
there was no other fundamental action taken to protest 
the racial constraints faced by blacks at Crown Zellerbach. 
While there were a number of isolated pickets at various 
times in 1965, there were no threats of a strike or 
call for a work stoppage to force Crown to resolve the 
problems of racial oppression and exploitation of black 
workers. 
By 1968, the struggle against the Crown Zellerbach 
Corporation and the white union locals was being waged 
entirely in the courts, with the intervention of the 
Federal government on behalf of the black plaintiffs. In 
January 1968, Crown Zellerbach agreed with the Office of 
14 
Northrup, p. 100. 
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Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) to institute the new 
seniority system demanded of it by the OFCC. Under this 
system promotions, layoffs and demotions would be deter¬ 
mined by a workers' mill plus job seniority; that is the 
length of time spent in the mill, plus, seniority within 
the line of progression, opposed to a worker's occupation¬ 
al seniority. This system it was thought, would equalize 
the position of blacks with white. Therefore, local 189 
of the United Papermakers and Paperworkers, along with 
the craft local at Crown; the International Brotherhood 
of Electrical Workers, threatened to strike. However, 
the United States Department of Justice enjoined the strike 
on the grounds that it violated Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act.-^ 
One month later this system had proved ineffective. 
It did not improve the ability of blacks to compete for 
better jobs. The government proposed, and the Federal 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 
accepted in its decision, that remedy of the discriminatory 
situation be confined to the "affected class;" which were 
those blacks employed prior to January 1966, when all jobs 
were indisputably opened to blacks. This was upheld in 
the case of the United States vs. Local 189, United Paper- 
makers and Paperworkers, Crown Zellerbach Corporation, et. al. 
1 C 
-'--'Herbert R. Northrup, The Negro In the Paper Industry: 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969) p. TUI 
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on March 26, 1968.^ The same decision was upheld by 
the District Court in the case that included two members 
of local 189A (the black local), David Johnson, Senior 
and Anthony Hill, as plaintiffs-intervenors.In its 
ruling on the appeal of the case by local 189 and Crown 
Zellerbach, the United States Court of Appeals affirmed 
1 ft 
the decision of the District Court, on July 28, 1969. 
The District Court had already ordered the full merger 
of the unions in 1968.^ 
The Court's order was also stipulated for the other 
large union at Crown's Bogalusa plant; the Pulp and Sul¬ 
phite Workers. This union was located in the plant's 
converting division - a box plant, a grocery bag plant, 
and a multiwall bag plant. It too had separate locals. 
As a result of the mergers, David Johnson, Sr,, who 
was president of the black local 189A of the United 
Papermakers and Paperworkers, became first General Vice- 
President of the merged unions. A. Z. Young, one time 
16See 282 F39 (E. D. La.), 1968. 
17301 F Supp. 906 (E. D. La., 1969). 
18 
See Local 189, United Papermaker and Paperworkers, 
et. al., vs. United States, United States Court of Appeals, 
5tïï"cTrcuït, No. 25956,~July' 28” l9"69~    
19 
Full texts of the cases can be found in Labor Cases 
Vols. 57LC9120, 60LC9274, and 60LC9289. See also Northrup, 
The Negro in the Paper Industry (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1969). There are also several related cases 
which discusses employment tests for minorities discrimina¬ 
tory practices of corporations and unions. See Griggs vs Duke 
Power Co. 401 U. S. 424 (1971), Emporium Co,, vs Western, 
42Ô U. S. 50(1975), Albermarle Paper Company vs. Moody 422 
422 U.S.405 (1975) Mansion House Center vs.NLRB,473F. 2d471 (1971). 
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president of the black local, 624, the International 
Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Papermill Workers, became 
20 
the first General Vice-President of the merged unions. 
The removal of the discriminatory policies at the Crown 
Zellerbach Corporation and the merger of the unions 
resulted in the opening up of a better occupational and 
employment situation for blacks. Notwithstanding the 
Court's decisions, the victories of the black community 
over the Crown Zellerbach Corporation was more the result 
of the struggle that it had waged from 1965 to 1967. 
There was another suit filed against Crown Zellerbach 
in 1968. Robert Hicks filed a suit to abolish the system 
of job seniority at Crown's box plant where he was employed, 
and established in its place a system of plant seniority 
with respect to promotions, selection of training and 
demotions. In this case also, the Court ruled against 
Crown Zellerbach and the white local 362, the International 
O I 
Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Papermill Workers. The 
result of the Court's decision forced Crown Zellerbach to 
open up supervisory positions to blacks. The first such 
position was offered to Hicks. He accepted the job, 
because his refusal would have in effect invalidated the law 
20 
Personal Interview, A. Z. Young, June 17, 1976. 
21 
See Robert Hicks vs. Crown Zellerbach, et. al., 
United States District Court, E. D. La., Civil Action 
No. 16638, Section B, April 8, 1968. 
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suit. However, he was not deluded about what his promotion 
meant. According to Hicks, "the company used this as an 
effort to break up the leadership of the Bogalusa Civic 
OO 
and Voters League, by offering Hicks a job as supervisor. 
The Hicks suit had alleged that there were no benefits 
given to persons who had been involved in the Civil Rights 
Movement. Therefore, in order to counteract this, Crown 
offered Hicks the job. However, Hicks also viewed this 
as a ploy to create division between he and Young: "they 
put me in the shipping department where Mr. Young worked, 
to supervise Mr. Young, which was supposed to create con¬ 
fusion between Mr. Young and myself, but it did not 
work." Hicks' promotion led to the acquisition of two 
black personnel supervisors, a black chemist, and a black 
engineer between 1968 and 1969. In the final analysis, the 
Crown Zellerbach Corporation's response to the grievances of 
the black union locals was the result of the pressure put 
on it by the federal government. If it was not for federal 
pressure the coporation would have succumbed to the demands 
of its white union locals, which it had done in previous 
years. 
Summary 
The Civil Rights Movement in Bogalusa, Louisiana from 
22 
Personal Interview, Robert Hicks, June 16, 1976. 
23Ibid., June 16, 1976. 
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1965 to 1975 was characteristic of the New-New South 
politics; it did not realize the rise of black political 
authorities; but it did realize a political leadership 
in the black community committed to a life and death 
struggle. Save it to say, the leadership has been the 
impetus for the struggles that have ensued over these 
ten years. The organization; the Bogalusa Civic and Voters 
League, which had previously functioned as a voter registra¬ 
tion organization, seized its civic responsibility under 
the leadership of Young, Hicks and Jenkins. The Deacons 
for Defense and Justice proved the insight of their leader¬ 
ship. Here was a situation in the general Civil Rights 
Movement, where nonviolence was the accepted theme but 
black people in Bogalusa, Louisiana organized themselves 
to meet antagonism with antagonism. Youth was also a 
crucial variable of the Bogalusa Movement. Therefore, 
the League organized a Youth League to effectively con¬ 
solidate black youth. 
The development of the Bogalusa Movement has various 
significant implications for present discussion of political 
organizing. Without obscuring certain particulars of the 
movement, one must pay close attention to several factors. 
Here was a Movement in the mid-sixties, where black people 
put together an effective organization with a political and 
"military" arm. Black women also palyed a dynamic role 
in the Movement. Mrs. Jenkins demonstrated an unyielding 
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determination to struggle despite the reluctance of some 
black men. The differences in the black community were 
never disregarded, for the sake of unity. For instance, 
there were a number of boycotts on churches whose ministers 
would not support the Movement. It was through constant 
criticism of them that many were persuaded to join the 
struggle. Moreover, the movement developed from the 
indigenous will of the black people, CORE, for example, 
never led the movement in Bogalusa, it only gave assistance. 
By 1975 more blacks were holding occupations that 
blacks never held before in Bogalusa. Crown Zellerbach 
now had three black engineers, two yard superintendents, 
r\ / 
a black personnel supervisor and assistant personnel 
supervisor, a black accountant supervisor, and a plant 
accountant, two black shipping supervisors, three black 
supervisors in its Southern Timber Division, and a black 
safety supervisor. Black women were also promoted to 
Crown's offices and on the assembly lines. The South Central 
Bell Telephone Company, the fourth largest taxpayer in the 
parish (See Appendix G) hired twenty blacks in 1975, most 
in the capacity of operators. The total number of black 
^The black personnel supervisor at Crown Zellerbach 
is Bringier H. Barker, who in September 1974 became the first 
elected black public official from Washington Parish, when he 
was elected to the Parish School Board. Barker is from 
Franklinton, Louisiana; the parish seat. In 1975, Franklinton 
elected its first black city council member. 
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employees by the City came to thirty-seven in 1975. Of 
this number two are office clerks and four are policemen, 
with the one black veteran policeman holding the rank 
of sergeant. The remainder of blacks working for the 
city are in maintenance. Also, by 1975 the number of 
black salespersons in the retail stores increased. 
There are now two black principals, both on the elemen¬ 
tary level. However, there are still no blacks on the 
administrative staff of the School Board. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY EVALUATION 
The struggle of black people for political and 
social change in the United States within the past 
twenty years, at least, has been characterized by two 
distinguishing features: as a struggle for democratic 
rights and as a struggle for development. Historically, 
the former manifested itself as a struggle for desegre¬ 
gation, an end to racial discrimination and oppression, 
and the enfranchisement of black people into the "American 
political process." The latter, particularly within the 
last five to seven years, has been an effort to organize 
and consolidate around various strategies for "self- 
determination" and "Liberation." The struggle for 
development was given impetus by the general themes of 
"black power" and "black nationalism," and is best illustra¬ 
ted by the call for five southern states, the theses 
that the city is the black man's land, the acquisition of 
capital, and to some extent the cultural affinity and 
identity with the African continent. 
Indeed regionalism has played a distinguishing role 
in both of these developments. From the mid-fifties to 
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to the late sixties the struggles of black people were 
characterized as struggles for desegregation and en¬ 
franchisement which were more profound in the southern 
rural areas, than in the northern urban areas. While such 
notions as "black power" and "black nationalism" in the 
above cited features, developed from the experience of 
black people in northern urban areas. This is not to sug¬ 
gest, however, that both forms of struggle do not have 
profound effects on each other. Indeed the struggle for 
democratic rights and development in some form or another 
characterize the general thrust of black people today; 
and it is just as profound in the rural South as in the 
urban North. 
The decisive analysis of the current intellectual 
period as that which posits the socio-economic apparatus 
is the key determinant of contradictions that black people 
experience in this country. Therefore; one would be 
remiss in his intellectual responsibility by omitting an 
analysis of the socio-economic factors which help shape 
the social and political dynamics of this society. 
Particularly, since these dynamics are characterized by the 
domination and control of a few persons over the socio¬ 
economic apparatus, and the historical subordination of 
black people, in particular, within the entire society. 
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Therefore, it seems to me, that studies of any dimension 
of the black experience must be posited within a exposition 
of the socio-economic factors which have helped shape 
that experience. It is with this general motion in mind, 
that this study was undertaken to present a descriptive 
and critical analysis of the character of black politics 
in a small southern town dominated by a multinational 
corporation. The study was confined to a ten year period, 
from 1965 to 1975, in order to describe the struggles of 
black people during the Civil Rights Movement and assess 
the outcome in terms of the changes of political life 
of blacks. Principal to this study was an analyisis of the 
multinational corporation and its impact on the town, par¬ 
ticularly within the last ten years. 
In the final analysis, it is this author's conclusion 
that Bogalusa, Louisiana is very much in the New South. We 
find here no black political authorities. Cited in Chapter V 
is one black person on the Bogalusa Charter Commission. His 
tenure though, ends with the liquidation of the Commission. 
Therefore his position is only significant in the long run, 
if the change in the commission form of government grants the 
black community electoral control over the two predominantly 
black precincts. (See Appendix H). The commission form of 
government and the at-large electoral systems have prevented 
the election of black persons to politically authoritative 
positions. While the presence of black persons in 
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such positions would mean decisive change for the 
black community, overall progress depends on changes 
in at least two broad areas: industry and leadership. 
Historically, all indicators point to Bogalusa 
as a "company town." In chapter three we described the 
Great Southern Lumber Company, the Gaylord Container 
Corporation and the Crown Zellerbach Corporation. While 
social discriminations may have lessened during the tenure 
of each company, their roles were generally consistent. 
This is particularly true of the race question where 
there was no change until the Federal government inter¬ 
vened against the Crown Zellerbach Corporation on behalf 
of black workers. 
The general opposition of each company, particularly 
Crown, to prevent any other major industry to come to 
Bogalusa has retarded economic and industrial growth. 
While Crown Zellerbach is the largest employer and taxpayer 
in Bogalusa and Washington Parish, it cannot provide jobs 
for all of the people of Bogalusa or the surrounding towns. 
Its employment stipulations have, hitherto, been confined 
to relatives of persons working for it. While Crown 
Zellerbach has upgraded some blacks to supervisory positions, 
it has remained neutral, at best on the question of black 
participation in the political decision-making process of 
the town. Contrary to the expectation that the advent of 
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multinational corporations in the American South would 
upset Southern "traditions," i.e. race relations, we 
find that this expectation has not been fulfilled in 
Bogalusa. 
The question of leadership concerns both the 
black and white communities. Since 1970 the governmental 
leadership of the town has been in the hands of segrega¬ 
tionists. The mayor, Louis Rawls has failed to establish 
or maintain a working relationship with either the black 
community or the "liberal" and "moderate" white community. 
Rawls is far from a dynamic leader. He has shown a lack 
of understanding of a South that now has Blacks partici¬ 
pating in city and county government. Moreover, the "li¬ 
beral" white community recognizes this lack of dynamic 
leadership that would bring Bogalusans together, but it is 
afraid to say so. This overall problem goes beyond the 
attitudinal positions of whites in Bogalusa, rather 
it points to the lack of foresightedness about future 
possibilities for the town. Indeed, if whites have yet 
to council on matters of future development, since they 
control the existing apparatus, it is very little that the 
black community can bring to this discussion. 
On the other hand, the leadership question in 
the black community is crucial to its consolidation, and 
to the options that it poses for change. It is important, 
-117- 
since there are no black political authorities repre¬ 
senting the black community in city government, that 
the black community demand tighter control of its leader¬ 
ship. This is very crucial, because in every political 
election that blacks have entered since 1967, the "old 
line opportunists" have prevented blacks from making 
the runoffs. Moreover, the representatives of the black 
community in such positions should be chosen from 
the ranks of those who have been consistent since the 
1960's. The problem, thoughis a lack of aggressive, 
young leadership. Indeed, one that is nurtured by the 
struggles of the 1960's and tutored by the experiences 
of a Young, Hicks and Jenkins, would provide the black 
community with a strong and dedicated leadership and one 
that can challenge the existing political arrangements 
with insightfulness. 
Murkel Sibley, who came to Bogalusa, after graduating 
from Southern University in 1970, to work at Crown 
Zellerbach as a Grocery Bag Accountant, is emerging as 
part of the future leadership of the black community. As 
stated in Chapter V Sibley ran for the City School Board 
in 1975. In March 1974, he had been promoted to Accounting 
Supervisor, the head accountant at Crown Zellerbach. In 
an interview with Sibley he summed up his views on the 
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politics in the black community. Sibley stated that 
"we have entirely too many groups here; too many leaders 
and not enough followers. We have too many old people 
who do not want to step aside and give up the little 
prestige and political power.However, Sibley also 
echoes the faith that the "old line" leadership has in the 
Courts and the traditional mechanisms of change: 
we are here just as a people, who are being 
suppressed. We don't make any political decisions, 
we do not determine our destiny to any extent, we 
raise a lot of "sand." Our battles are going to 
be won in the Courts, and we know they are going 
to be won in the Courts, until we can get enough 
blacks registered. Until we can get enough blacks 
educated as to really what's going on.2 
Although Sibley's perception is basically traditional, his 
presence in the town is a hope for both blacks in the 
community and at the Crown Zellerbach Corporation. 
Progress is spoken of in terms of the jobs that 
some blacks have received, jobs that were once held by 
whites. However, substantive changes have not come about 
in the relationships between blacks and whites in this 
small southern town. There is still very deep contempt on 
the part of whites toward blacks, and in a general sense 
the city lacks dynamic leadership.^ White "liberals" are 
Personal Interview, Murkel Sibley, June 17, 1976. 
2Ibid., June 17, 1976 
3 
Mayor Louis Rawls, who, for example, became mayor in 
1970 ran for re-election and won in 1974 on the asinine slogans, 
"Accomplishments with God and the People's Help" and "Plat¬ 
form to Continue with the Lord's Work." 
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also very much excluded from the basic political 
functioning of the town; the segregationists still control 
the apparatus there.^ The economic situation has become 
dim, not only for blacks, but also whites. Despite the 
merged labor unions, black workers do not even participate. 
Within the black community, Young and others feel that 
the only hope is its own consolidation, particularly 
economically. There has been talk of economic pools and 
the like, but no concrete efforts have been made in this 
regard. 
It is this author's evaluation, then, that while 
the increase in better jobs for some blacks signifiy 
some progress, the situation remains the same ten years later. 
Whites have been determined to keep the political arena 
closed to blacks, as one indicator of this. The Crown 
Zellerbach Corporation's continued limitation of the 
number of jobs given to blacks, is another indicator. The 
School System continues to terminate black teachers while 
black students find little value in further education and 
the like, after graduating from high school. Popular 
culture, in the form of "black exploitation" films and 
drugs have added to the lack of incentive and motivation among 
black youth. Even institutions, like the black YMCA , 
no longer provides a place of identity for the black commu¬ 
nity. Seemingly, then the black community has been 
^On April 16, 1976, Mayor Rawls cut the ribbon opening 
the Sixth District headquarters of the Ku Klux Klan in Bogalusa. 
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accommodated to the situation by a small increase in 
the socio-economic level of some blacks, while the basic 
constraints on the entire black community remains very 
much the same. 
This study concludes that the Civil Rights Move¬ 
ment, while registering the black community's discontent 
with the existing social and political arrangements in 
Bogalusa, did not produce decisive changes in the condi¬ 
tions in their lives. Several factors are indicative of 
this point: (1) the electoral arena remain such that 
blacks cannot be elected to political office, (2) the 
school system, while desegregated, has retarded the 
incentive of black youth, (3) the leadership in the black 
community had not been consolidated around a united stra¬ 
tegy for confronting the political arrangements of the 
town, and (4) the Crown Zellerbach Corporation, as the 
largest employer and taxpayer, has failed in its 
responsibility to encourage fundamental change in the 
traditional race relations and stimulate greater social 
development in Bogalusa. 
If real change is possible in Bogalusa, then, the 
black community must reassert itself to bring that change 
about. Protest in the.tradition of thel960's has not 
occurred there since 1970. The leadership of the black 
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community has been quiescence, and has returned to its 
traditional role of endorsing candidates for office, 
registering people to vote; and the utilization of the 
courts as the solution of the problems. 
As one who has observed for the past ten years and 
participated in some of the historical activity analyzed 
above, this author concludes that the only possible meaning¬ 
ful and fundamental change in the political life and life 
chances of black people in Bogalusa can only occur with 
a reassertion of a radical criticism against the pre¬ 
vailing political authorities and arrangements of the 
town. It is only until the black community reconstruct 
its agenda of political struggle that real progress can 
be measured. Indeed while it is true that political 
consciousness of the black community was raised by the 
movement of the Sixties, it remains a constant that the 
life chances of blacks are as low ten years later as 
they were in 1965. This thesis has attempted to present 
a case of New South development that is still tragically 
retarded by Old South ideologies in the midst of a 
New-New South, characterized by the ascendency of black 
political authorities in particular and the participation 
of black people in its political arrangements. 
Finally, this study concludes with several larger 
implications: (1) hitherto, analysis of black politics in 
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the American South have been done on Southern urban 
areas, i. e., Atlanta, New Orleans, Memphis and others. 
This study presents an analysis of black politics in a 
non-metropolitan Southern town, (2) most studies have fo¬ 
cused exclusively on black political participation in the 
form of voting, holding public office and the like. This 
study presents an analysis of participation in the form 
of protest, i. e., demonstrations, armed defense, (3) we 
find in this study several variables which contradict most 
modernization theses (which suggest that black political 
leadership in the American South has remained under the 
control of traditional black elites, i.e., ministers, 
educators, and morticians). In this study we find a 
younger, progressive and militant leadership, and 
(4) finally, this study suggests that an analysis of 
black political development vis-a-vis industrial develop¬ 
ment is a useful framework to the study of black politics 
in the American South. 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
BOGALUSA POPULATION STATISTICS 
The following table shows the phenomenal growth of Boga- 
lusa from 1906 to 1914; the year of its incorporation. 
1906  Started to build town 
1907   1500 
1908   2000 
1909   3000 
1910   5000 
1911   7500 
1912   9500 
1913  10,000 
1914  11,000 
Source: U. S. Bureau of Census 
Population growth in Bogalusa has been moderate in recent 
history. 
1930  14,029 
1940  14,604 
1950  17,798 
1960  21,423 
1970  18,412 
Source: U. S. Bureau of Census, Characteristics of the 
Population in Louisiana, 1970. 
Present Population by Race 
Total White Black 
18,412 12,229 6,183 
Source: U. S. Bureau of Census, 1970 
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APPENDIX B 
THE CROWN ZELLERBACH CORPORATION - FINANCIAL STATUS - 1975 
Net Sales  
Net Income  
Per Share of Common Stock  
Dividends Declared per share of Common Stock. 
Shares of Common Stock  











The Officers of the Bogalusa Civic and Voters League - 
1965 to Present 
President : 
Vice President: 
A. Z. Young 
Occupation: 1965 -Laborer at Crown 
Zellerbach 
Present-Director of the De- 
parment of Human Re¬ 
lations, State of 
Louisiana 
Robert Hicks 
Occupation: 1965 - Laborer at Crown 
Zellerbach 
Present- Shipping Supervisor 
at Crown Zellerbach 
Secretary: Mrs. Gayle Jenkins 






Treasurer: Robert T. Young 




Financial Secretary: Charles Sims 






COMMITTEE FOR CONCERN- RE; BOGALUSA, LOUISIANA 
DEFINITE PROPOSALS TO BE DISCUSSED WITH THE EXECUTIVES’ OF CROUN-ZELLERSACH 
(Please NOTE1. ; These recommendations will NOT be sent to the Crown-Zel 1er bach 
Corporation in advance of the requested meeting, They are for YOUR information 
ONLY.) 
1. That the Crown-Zellarbach Corporation prepare - both nationally and at its 
Bogalusa plant - a general policy statement re-iterating Its support of 
equal rights and protection for all citizens under the Constitution of the 
United States and the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the immediate end of 
discrimination in public accommodations; the right of ail citizens to 
exercise their franchise to regincar and to vote unhindered; desegregation 
of the public schools, and its £uJ1 support of totally non—discriminatory 
practices in all areas of employment. 
Further, that Crown-Z 
ICu Kin:; Klan and simi 
attempt to dissuade, 
the fret erarei.se of 
k;iiarbacli s trongly decIcre its op?og ; t ion to the 
.1er organisations and/or any a : tien that would 
harm, intimidate or prevent any individual from 
their rights and/or their right to free assemblage 
and speech. 
In addition, that the. Ctown-Zellerbach management in Bogs lus a 
policy knur-re to all of their employees by including such a s 
in Cut noxl ampleyre • ngi upon, ta e 
to similarly support and protect the rights of a lid U3 . 
make this 
tacement ; % 
r employee* 
2. That Crovrt-Zslierhach request of Bogalusa public officials - in particular, 
Mayor Jesse Cutrer - the immediate appointment of a truly Inter-Racial 
Council ; on. which the top executive of Bogalusa Crown-Zellarbach would 
serve. 
3,. That Crown-Zeller bach request the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F,B,Ï.) 
to open and/or re-open their investigations into the. series of whippings, 
cross burnings and other intimidating activity; the Brooks Hays incident, 
and the recent occurrences during the past two weeks ... and insist that 
the FBI identify and prosecute those involved. 
4, That Crcwn-Zellerbach enter into an agreement whereby they will dismiss 
any and all employees who are involved in such activity as described 
above and/or are found to be members of the Ku Kivu: Klan or similar 
organizations; and that such a policy be made known to Crown-Zellerbach 
employees. 
5. That Crovrn-Zellerbach communicate with the appropriate Federal authorities 
for actio;* when and where necessary and for a total commitment from such 
agencies to protect the rights of all American citizens in Bogalusa. 
Specifically recommended are; The Office of the President of the United 
States; Vice President Hubert fi. Humphrey, who is directly charged with 
the basic responsibility of all governmental agencies involved in the area 
of civil rights; Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, John Dore and 
others in the Justice Department, and the Community Relations Service. 
Since Mr. Brooks Hays was not allowed to appear in Bogalusa due to 
intimidation by the Klan and the lack of continuing backing by civic 
leaders including Crown-Zellerbach, the executives of the Bogalusa opera¬ 
tion should take it upon themselves to sponsor a series of orientation 
meetings in conjunction with the Federal Community Relations Service. 
ô. That communication be made with the Governor of Louisiana, John J. 
KcKeithen, requesting the full resourses of his office be available and 
used to correct the situation in Bogalusa and other places in Louisiana. 
7. That Bogalusa Crown-Zellerbach officials also directly communicate with the 
)onr..‘. Police Department and with the Sheriffs Office, insisting that they 
perform their duty and obligation for the protection of all people and 
that both use the full force of their powers to suppress and halt the 
lawlessness ar.d brutality of the Klan and others, 
8» That ZelLerhrch !?.HV.P. nr. official ooli'y that they arcl/or their 
reçut:.7n3 will ~d' thg" n uwithhold support from any candidate for 
puni in office - in rojyc1.ua a or anywhere xn the •'•cate o! Louisiana - 
who . ar-c ;io~r.. co.vh. Z"c on supports in ar.y ac itrvit .t«s of the 
I : w. end/or .similar or ind'J . 
9. Thai 1 ,o rn Ze Herb-tick bai i r-g mine ifs ou. y,.-}.i.-y puni Lely known in 
Bogalusa ai], parte of Louisiana and Kit locally •* request that local 
oific-.ftl.-5 issue a policy statement to ail press media and by this and 
other means of ccam>uKï cai.icr.., rail for an. cep: try ■ n'.cb rv.laK and for the 
control of, arl r.ppnsl <-<or be ell arga ait a «_'■ c t-v.. hr lilcs Ilian and 
" tari-oris*, activitic.• ;'' 
10. That Crow. Zellerbacb nu.tur -* r.*^the Bogai:*.s* *h-.I ephor.e Company and other 
public utilities v.oj«jaus;ic«..*doa at v. vith the Fcc-ra. Jccvifracedons Commission 
to assure that such cnmavDO-atlon rs net disruyked as periods of dis¬ 
tress and/or violence againsttivil rights participants or others. 
Also that a special request be directed to the FBI to investigate the 
curious circumstances by which an "out of order-' report was given on 
all phonos in. the area for a period of more than one hour during the 
"siege" period, Wednesday night, February 3, 1SÔ5. (See Addendum below) 
ADDENDUM - BACKGROUND ON BOGALUSA 
A. On the night of February 3 when Yates and Miller were holed-up in the Cafe, 
a very frightening thing developed. The phone service on the whole area 
of the ghetto was disrupted for more then one hour. Tie could not reach 
Yates and Miller in the Cafe, nor other persons in the area. The phones 
rangconstantly busy -- and upon checking, the Bogalusa operators would 
simply report the phones as being "OUT OF ORDER". A smart and persistent 
Boston operator finally broke the barrier when it occurred to her rather 
strange that so many phones were "out of order" at such a crucial time. 




B. Shots were fired by the pursuers during the chase leading to the 
beating and during the flight of Yates and Hiller into the Cafe. 
COMMITTEE FOR CONCERN- RE: EOGALUSA, LOUISIANA 
Committee Chairman - Wilfred T. Ussery, 2nd National Vice Chairman, 
CORE - FI 6-4465 
Committee Co-ordinator* Kiss Shirley Ann Mesher - JO 7-3430 
Assistant Co-ordinator- Mrs. Ruth Gottstein - SE 1-6932 
Assistant Co-ordinator- Miss Patricia Murphy - JO 7-3430 
*And Public Relations - Press Co-ordinator. 
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October 13, 1563 
10 
So s ochool Board mi other Officials 
rrosu The Youth and iareata of loculus* 
i the youth of 3ogaluaa are protesting for eqtml education, 
o intend to protect until our demands for equal education 




tuai all smdesuta immediately be supplied, with all books 
And supplies necessary for cur studiea* 
That our seieabo laboratories be brought up to date with 
equipment and supplies* 
Hit the equipment of all physical education, departments 
be brought up to date with that of the -whit® schools. 
That at least one doctor or nurse be assigned to each 
i*XC»* O ow a 
Peat at least one other foreign language be offered at the 
.Central Yesjorial High bchool besides Preach* 
that the shop teachers refrain from sending students out • 
to now -the superl ntendant*s lawn and work,, on .his house and 
that a worthwhile program be adopted and sufficient equipment 
. be Ins-called... 
That we have store and better qualified teachers*-. • 
That all needed repairs* and remailing of tho school premises 
be acted upon immediately». Specifically, that central heating 
be provided, in all schools* -. 
Thai: disciplinary action be hausen against .the. person or persons 
responsible. for locking the school doors on Wednesday,. J%M:j 
October 13, 1365* 
That disciplinary action be tajæn against teachers when 
complaints are filed* 
- S 
'■.tvi'* .-\ 
mKj jgV. > ' 
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Bogaluaa Votera League 
¥3 danand of Mayor Cutrer and of tha other city officials: 
1» Fair and adequate poMce protection far the Negro citizens ôf Bogalucs in 
their daily activities, as well as protection for demonstrators. 
2» The end of unfair and. illegal ordinances, such as the segregation of publia 
facilities, tha segregation, of public accomodations, the restrictions upon peaci- 
able assembly— for example, the ordinance limiting pickets to two ner establish^. 
3* Adéquat» lighting, adequate sewage facilities, adequately paved streaca, and 
other public services for the Negro citizens and taxpayers of Bogalusa, Further 
«he enfaroessent of pausing -‘standards throughout the city, 
4» Equal opportunity for Negroes to gain access to smolnysaait by public auihorii 
Specifically, we cl strand tha hiring of Negroes to the police fores and to the firs 
dan&rts«nt*,. 
5*. That'tha city licensing daparfcàesd: and.dimerizdnaticri .r.gaArvri--Negara*» arid. „ 
license qualified Negroes as pi,umbers and electricians, 
6 , That there be established, fair*- and consistent procedures 1er the processing 
and adjudication of complaints by Negroes against police and other city officials 
7* That 'Title H of" the-Civil Eights Ant of .1964 (regarding public acccmcdations 
be- fully and effectively-enforced iharaighout the city, 
3* That'.all of the public schools of Bogaluaa, be desegregated, and that the 
.-teaching., staff "of the public, schools, be integrated without discrimination against 
Negro teachers» :.v 
lr* \ ; ' - 
9> That-Negroes, who compris» over on»—third of the city's peculation, be 
included, cm all city and parish policy-Bsaking and advisory boards. 
10» That- there be established immediately 3 bi-rsciai ccjnrdttee, v/ith full 
and carol at a representation of tha Negro coxmunity including the officials 
of tha Eogalûsa Voters League, to meet, and to deal with the long-range problems 
of this., city, 
11, That Cape, Haynes ITascaab and Patrolman Bernard Nil,llama, as well as other 
policemen, who beat and otherwise miatreat Negroes, fca immediately dismissed, and 
that officers who oo> treat Negroes in the futurs be similarly treated. 
l!d demand of tha businessmen of Bogalusa: 
1„ Equal oppcrtunity in the emnloyaant of Negroes at all Bogalusa stereo, 
2, The inclusion of Negroes In all job categories, with equal opportunity for 
prenotion and advancement. 
We demand of the officials of Washington Parish: 
1» Fair and adequate police protection for ths Negro citizens of Vîashidgbcn 
Parish in their daily lives, aa well a3 the protection of dénionstratora, 
2, Equal ssraloyasent opportunities for Negress on the Pariah Sharif *3 force— 
specifically and initially we dscand the hiring of a Negro to replace the 
murdered O’Neal Moore, and tha guaranteeing of full reinstatement and seniority 
for the injured Creed Rogers. 
3» A full and complete investigation of the murder of O’Neal Moore, and the 
full and swift prosecution of his murderers. 
4. 'Ena dismissal of'Vertrsea Mams and Officer Lyons for the beating and mis¬ 
treatment of Negroes, .and similar treatment for any other officer who acts in a - 
similar- manner. r.
; 
We demand of Governor MeKeithen and of the other officials of the state of 
Louisiana: 
1» Fair and adequate police protection for the Negro citizens of Louisiana in 
their daily activities, aa well as protection for demonstrators, 
2. Equal employment opportunities for Negroes in state employ; specifically and 
initially the hiring of Negroes for the state police farce. 
3. The end of uneanstitutisnai laws, such aa the prohibition upon teachers 
against participating in Civil Rights demonstrations» 
4., The removal of all racial signa from all state buildings, 
5, Ths desegregation of all state facilities and schools* 
6, The desegregation of all public accomodations in the state, 
7, A full and correlate investigation of the murder of O’Neal Mocre, and the 
full and jswift prosecution of his murderers. 
8, The desegregation of Charity Hospital, Bogalusa. Also an end to the refusal 
of Charity Hospital to adequately treat Negro patients—for example, their failure 
to act swiftly and effectively to treat the demonstrator injured on Saturday, 
July 19, 1965; their failure to treat adequately the demonstrators injured at 
the city park, as well as their general failure to give prompt, effective, and 
courteous treatment to Negro patients. 
APPENDIX G 
TEN LARGEST TAXPAYERS IN WASHINGTON PARISH 
1. Crown Zellerbach Corporation  
2. Southern Natural Gas Company  
3. Louisiana Power and Light Company  
4. South Central Bell Telephone Company . . . . 
5. Florida Gas Transmission Company  
6. Washington - St. Tammany Co-op Incorporated. 
7. United Gas, Incorporated  
8. Illinois General Gulf Railroad Company . . . 
9. United Gas Pipeline Company  
10. Dixie Pipeline Company  

















Population by Race of Proposed Election Districts, 
ELECTION DISTRICTS 
City of Bogalusa: 5 District Plan 
POPULATION (1970) 
(and component 






ED 25 856 844 6 0 2 4 
26 1,278 1,273 2 2 1 0 
27 809 788 21 0 0 0 
28 983 983 0 0 0 0 
29(part) 100(est.) 91(est.) 8(est.) 0 l(est.) 0 
Total 4?026(est.) 3,979(est.) 37(est.) 2 4(est.) 4 
Percent over (under) Ideal3 9.3 
District 2: 
ED 21 80 80 0 0 0 0 
22 1,343 1,111 232 0 0 0 
23 860 11 847 1 1 0 
24 1,557 98 1,459 0 0 0 
29(part) 78(est.) 71(est.) 6(est.) 0 l(est-) 0 
Total 3,918(est.) l,371(est.) 2,544(est.) 1 2(est.) 0 
Percent over (under) Ideal3 6.4 
District 3: 
ED 30 596 421 175 0 0 0 
31 405 128 276 1 0 0 
32 1,102 25 1,077 0 0 0 
33 1,112 39 1,073 0 0 0 
34 319 11 308 0 0 0 
42(part) 80(est.) 0(est.) 80(est.) 0 0 0 
Total 3,614(est.) 624(esfc.) 2,989(est.) 1 0 0 
Percent over (under) Ideala (1.8) 
District 4: 
ED 29(part) 300{est.) 274(est.) 24(est.) 0 2(est.) 0 
35 255 255 0 0 0 0 
40 1,284 1,281 2 0 0 1 
41 633 566 63 0 0 4 
42(part) l,061(est.) 618(est.) 442(est.) 0 0 l(est.) 
Total 3,533(est.) 2,994(est.) 531(est.) 0 2(est.) 6(est.) 
Percent over (under) Ideala (4.0) 
TABLE 2 
Estimated Voter Registration by Race of Proposed Election Districts, 
City of Bogaiusa: 5 District Plan 
REGISTERED VOTERS5 
ELECTION DISTRICT'S 




Precinct 4 1,117 1,117 0 
5 1,354 1,337 17 
Total 2,471 2,454 17 
District 2: 
Precinct 1 (part) l,230(est.) 353(est.) 877(est.) 
8A (part) 452(est.) 452(est.) 0 
Total l,682(est.) 805(est.) 877(est.) 
District 3: 
Precinct 1 (part) 100(est.) 100(est.) 0 
2 (part) l,503(sst.) 401 (est.) l,107(est.) 
3A (part) lOOfest.) lOOfest.) 0 
Total l,708(est.) 601(est.) l,107(est.) 
District 4: 
Precinct 1 (part) 254(est.) 254{est.) 0 
2 (part) 148(est.) 0 148{est.) 
3 1,675 1,555 120_ 
Total 2,077{esfc.) l,809(est.) 2S8(est.) 
District 5: 
Precinct 6 633 839 0 
7 1.657 1,656 _1 
Total 2,236 2,295 1 
City Totals 10,234 7,364 2,270 
aAIl precincts are in Ward 4 of Washington Parish. 
5Voter registration by race by precinct supplied by Curtis M. Thomas, Washington Parish 
Registrar of Voters. 
Prepared by: Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc. 
2 
ELECTION DISTRICTS  POPULATION (1970) 
(and component 




ED 29(part) 100 (est.) 91(est.) 8(est.) 0 l(est.) 
36 545 544 0 1 0 
37 632 632 0 0 0 
38 1,059 1,059 0 0 0 
39 985 985 0 0 0 
Total 3,321(est.) 3,311(est.) 8(est.) 1 l(est.) 




aIdeaI District Population 
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